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I. INTRODUCTION
When active counterterrorist measures have not succeeded in destroying terrorist 
organizations and intelligence has failed to detect their plots, security measures constitute 
the last line of defense. But does security work against an adversary that poses such unique 
challenges? Empirical evidence is hard to come by. Terrorist incidents are statistically rare 
and random, making it difficult to discern direct effects. Security against terrorism seems 
to work primarily as a deterrent. The fact that terrorists focus the overwhelming majority 
of their attacks on “soft” targets that have little protection or carry out their attacks in ways 
that obviate security suggests that terrorists are deliberately avoiding better-protected 
targets. That itself is evidence that security has some effect on terrorist decisionmaking. 
Increased security does not reduce terrorism, but it appears to push terrorists away from 
some targets. However, these indirect effects are visible only over long periods of time. 
Terrorism is intended to create fear—and it often works. Even small attacks cause 
significant alarm. As a result, an apprehensive public demands absolute security. But 
increased protection around terrorists’ traditional targets has driven them toward more 
random, indiscriminate attacks—that is, pure terrorism. Today’s terrorist organizations 
justify and encourage attacks such as mass killings and less-rational, unpredictable small-
scale assaults, which are harder to prevent. 
Continued terrorist interest in transportation targets was demonstrated in the March 
2016 bombing of the metro in Brussels, in which 13 people died; the July 2016 knife 
and axe attack on train passengers in Wuerzberg, Germany, in which four persons were 
injured; and the discovery in October 2016 of an improvised explosive device on a London 
Underground train. Terrorists see transit and passenger rail as attractive targets. Designed 
for public convenience, trains, subways, and stations offer terrorists easy access to crowds 
of people in confined environments where attackers face minimal security risks and where 
bombings, shootings, and other types of attacks can cause high casualties. Terrorist 
attacks on widely used public transport also create significant alarm—daily commuters 
and other passengers cannot easily avoid what they perceive as a source of danger. 
At the same time, it is not easy to increase 
security without causing inconvenience, 
unreasonably slowing travel times, adding 
significant costs, and creating vulnerable 
queues of people waiting to pass through 
security checkpoints. 
This has compelled rail operators to explore other security options. These include enlisting 
passengers and staff in alerting authorities to suspicious objects or behavior, random 
passenger screening, designing new stations to facilitate surveillance and reduce potential 
casualties from explosions or fire, and ensuring rapid intervention and evacuation of people 
out of harm’s way. 
But do these—or any security measures against terrorism—work? 
Designed for public convenience, trains, 
subways, and stations offer terrorists 
easy access to crowds of people.
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This report examines the terrorist threat, how security against terrorism has evolved over 
the years, and the overall effectiveness and specific effects of security measures on 
terrorist tactics and targeting.1 It addresses five questions: 
• How has terrorism evolved in recent years and what is the nature of the contemporary 
terrorist threat? 
• How does terrorism differ from certain other forms of violent crime and from other 
modes of armed conflict—and what are the implications of these differences for 
security against terrorist attacks? 
• How have the officials charged with security responsibilities in both the public and 
private sectors tried to protect against terrorist attacks? 
• How well have security measures worked? 
• Since physical security measures seldom catch terrorists like insects in a net, do 
security measures have a deterrent effect on terrorism?
Each of these questions brings up numerous additional questions. For example, How 
have terrorist tactics or the targets of terrorist attacks changed since terrorism emerged in 
its contemporary form in the late 1960s and early 1970s? How do the authorities decide 
on the allocation of their limited resources for security? This itself is a complex discussion 
with broader implications for how society reacts to terrorism. If terrorist attacks cannot all 
be prevented, can more be done to reduce the terror they are intended to create? How 
do terrorists try to overcome or obviate security measures put in place to stop them? 
Why do terrorists seem to succeed so often? Is it 
because security measures often fail? And If that 
is the case, how and why do they fail? Can the 
effectiveness of security measures be empirically 
evaluated? According to what criteria? 
Even raising such questions risks ruffling some feathers, as they may be perceived as 
critical of government homeland security efforts or those of the security industry. Some 
may wrongly interpret this discussion as going soft on the security of the American people 
on grounds that it is futile or as a misguided attempt to mechanically apply cost-benefit 
analysis to the complex threat posed by terrorists. None of these are my intentions. The 
purpose of this report is to provide a better understanding of what can (and cannot) be 
achieved, at what cost.
Questions of costs and effectiveness were close to irrelevant in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11. The United States had just suffered the worst attack in the annals of terrorism. 
More large-scale attacks were anticipated, with possibly even worse consequences. The 
perceived necessity was to do whatever the country could do to prevent another major 
attack. As time has passed, however, questions about America’s response have arisen. 
Always pragmatists, Americans want to know not simply if they are safer—they are—but 
whether continued involvement in foreign wars and the significant security expenditures at 
home are prerequisites to keeping America safe. 
Can the effectiveness of security 
measures be empirically evaluated?
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Introduction
The observations and conclusions presented in this report are drawn from research 
conducted over the past 20 years at the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) and from 
my work at other research institutions. But the report also reflects views developed 
from my personal experience over the past four decades as a member of or advisor to 
various national commissions on terrorism and as a consultant to law enforcement and 
the private sector.2
Security against terrorism can be defined broadly to include all measures aimed at 
reducing the terrorist threat overall while protecting society against terrorist attacks. 
In its broadest sense, security would include military efforts abroad to destroy terrorist 
organizations or at least degrade their operational capabilities, foreign and domestic 
intelligence collection, and law enforcement, augmented by physical security measures—
the last line of defense. The U.S. Defense Department classifies these efforts either as 
“counterterrorism,” comprising offensive measures against terrorist organizations, or 
“antiterrorism,” comprising defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of persons and 
property.3 This report focuses specifically on antiterrorist or physical security measures. 
It excludes military operations against terrorist groups and efforts to resolve conflicts that 
may lead to terrorism or efforts to counter violent extremism, which are components of a 
broader strategy to combat terrorism. The report only touches upon the role of intelligence 
and more-active measures such as countersurveillance. It does, however, examine efforts 
to enlist the public in alerting authorities to suspicious activity. 
Although they represent a narrower subset of efforts to counter terrorism, physical security 
measures include not only efforts to discourage attacks or prevent successful attacks, but 
also measures to reduce casualties and damage if an attack occurs. The latter include 
design and construction features to mitigate the effects of explosions and facilitate rapid 
response and evacuations. As a general observation, the difficulties of preventing terrorist 
attacks have pushed counterterrorism strategy upstream toward intervention before 
attacks occur and at the same time have caused those in charge of security to increase 
efforts aimed at mitigation, resiliency, rapid response, and speedy recovery after an attack. 
The role of physical security measures is limited—despite 
best efforts to stop them, determined terrorists will carry 
out attacks. Society can try to address the grievances that 
give rise to radicalization and recruitment, discourage or 
deflect individuals from becoming terrorists, intervene at 
the earliest possible indication of violent intentions, uncover and disrupt terrorist plots, 
prevent successful attacks or deter terrorists from attacking certain targets through 
physical security measures, design facilities in ways that will mitigate casualties, facilitate 
rapidly neutralizing any attack that occurs, and facilitate rapid recovery. Physical security 
measures are only one component of this sequence. 
Increasing emphasis is now being placed on countering violent extremism. The results 
of this effort are not yet clear. Laws and procedures also have been changed to facilitate 
intelligence collection and allow authorities to intervene earlier—well before an attempted 
attack. This has opened a new domain in law enforcement and security between the 
first indications of criminal intentions and actual attempts to commit terrorist acts. In law 
Despite best efforts to stop 
them, determined terrorists 
will carry out attacks.
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enforcement, it has allowed prosecution on the basis of intentions, which, in turn, has 
expanded the use of confidential informants and undercover police intelligence operations. 
This appears to have achieved some success.
Current research is exploring whether anything can be done in the narrower time frame 
between an attacker’s final commitment to action and an actual attack. In other words, 
can we widen the last line of defense? At what point does an imminent attack become 
manifest? Behavior detection looks for indications of suspicious behavior. Are there subtle 
but visible clues in individual behavior indicating imminent attack that may be discerned by 
trained observers or by computerized real-time analysis of video surveillance? Such clues 
might take the form of unusual behavior—loitering in odd places or visibly avoiding security 
personnel at the scene of the intended attack. Theoretically, intentions could be tested 
through subtle prompts—an provocative image or a question that pops up on the screen 
at an airport check-in kiosk while facial expressions are monitored. This is a controversial 
new area where developments potentially could have profound consequences for security 
but also for the law and individual privacy.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT 
The report begins with a description of the origins of contemporary terrorism and the major 
changes that have occurred. It examines the reason for the apparent dramatic increase 
in the volume of terrorist activity worldwide, the escalation of violence as terrorists have 
sought higher and higher body counts, the increasingly indiscriminate nature of terrorist 
violence as attackers kill in quantity or move toward totally random killing, the rise of 
suicide terrorist attacks, and the phenomenon of remotely inspiring and instructing 
distant supporters who are not physically in touch with a terrorist organization—so-called 
homegrown terrorists—to carry out attacks. 
The next section looks at the ways in which terrorism differs from more-conventional modes 
of armed conflict and from certain forms of crime such as high-value armed robberies, and 
what these differences mean for security. Terrorists have the enormous advantage of virtually 
unlimited targets. Security does not prevent terrorism; it merely increases the chance of 
terrorist failure or displaces the risk to other, more-vulnerable targets—more often the latter. 
Unlike wartime commando raids or armed robberies, terrorist attacks do not require tactical 
success to be effective. Since terrorism is aimed at attracting attention and creating terror, 
even failed attempts can still cause 
alarm and oblige authorities to respond 
with new security measures that seem to 
validate public fears. This psychological 
dimension of terrorism is critical to the 
theory of terrorism itself, but it is often 
overlooked in society’s responses. 
The report next considers how much is spent on security against terrorism and what society 
expects the expenditures to accomplish. What antiterrorist strategies and approaches 
are used? What are the specific categories of security measures, what are they each 
intended to do, and how well do they work? This section also looks at some of the major 
developments in security over the years and explores the effects of these developments. 
Security does not prevent terrorism; it 
merely increases the chance of terrorist 
failure or displaces the risk to other, more-
vulnerable targets—more often the latter.
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Measuring the effectiveness of security measures against terrorism turns out to be 
extremely difficult, as terrorism poses unique challenges that defy easy empirical evaluation. 
Terrorists can overcome almost all security challenges by changing their target sets. Their 
usual direction, and therefore the long-range trend in terrorist violence, is toward softer 
targets that are difficult, disruptive, and costly to defend. But this is not always the case: 
On some occasions, terrorists seem determined to go after harder targets even when 
easier targets are available, in order to defeat a challenge and display their determination 
and skill—thus creating more public fear. 
Cost-benefit analyses of security can be performed, using fatalities and the economic costs 
of the damage and disruption to commerce caused by the terrorists as the criteria. But 
these analyses ignore the psychological dimension. The effect of a terrorist attack is not 
simply a matter of the number of deaths or the amount of destruction that results, it must 
also include the psychological effects on the 
terrorists’ target audience. While the statistical 
risk to the individual is minuscule compared with 
the risk of other sources of mortality, the societal 
impacts of even modest terrorist attacks—
whether the attacks are successful or not—can 
be significant. 
That would seem to make security against terrorism an almost futile undertaking; however, 
terrorists take security seriously, and some long-term effects of security are discernible. 
When faced with high levels of security, terrorists do alter their behavior. There is anecdotal 
and statistical evidence that security measures have a deterrent effect, which is examined 
later in the report. 
Since much of the research discussed here pertains to surface transportation, the report 
offers some specific observations about the challenges faced by transportation security. 
In particular, it examines how terrorists view surface transportation as a target and what 
terrorist plotters think about specific security measures in that theater of their activity. 
The report ends with some overall conclusions.
While the statistical risk to the 
individual is minuscule...the societal 
impacts of even modest terrorist 
attacks...can be significant.
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II. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT
Terrorist tactics have been used for centuries, but terrorism in its contemporary form 
emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The phenomenon announced its arrival with 
a series of spectacular events, including a number of political assassinations and a rise 
in terrorist bombings. Assassinations and bombings had been part of the terrorist tactical 
repertoire for decades, but modern terrorists added some new tactics. The first airline 
hijacking with political demands occurred in 1968. Terrorists turned to multiple hijackings 
in 1970. The first kidnapping of a diplomat in order to make political demands occurred 
in 1969. The first politically motivated bombing of a commercial airliner took place in 
1970. The first embassy seizure by terrorists took place in 1972. Ransom kidnappings by 
terrorists to fund their operations began in 1973. 
No common cause connected the groups responsible for these early events other than 
a shared sense of failure and frustration that neither the mass protests nor the more 
traditional modes of guerrilla warfare that marked the political ferment of the 1960s had 
achieved success. Mao Zedong’s concept of guerrilla warfare made the people, normally 
consigned to the sidelines of the battlefield in 
conventional warfare, an essential part of war-
fighting strategy. Military operations had to have 
a political component to be justified—they had to 
appeal to the masses. Terrorism further elevated 
the role of the audience. The primary purpose of 
most terrorist operations was to affect perceptions. 
Terrorism was aimed at the people watching. 
Terrorists did not need to match the military capacity of their adversaries. Small groups 
with a limited capacity for violence could achieve disproportionate effects by carrying out 
spectacular acts intended to attract attention and cause people to exaggerate the terrorists’ 
strength and inflate the perceived threat. The mere creation of terror enabled terrorists to 
achieve their political goals.
Technological developments also played a key role in the rise of modern terrorism. Modern 
technology-dependent society offered new vulnerabilities. Explosives could easily be 
acquired or fabricated. Expanding production produced volumes of firearms that made them 
a commodity like any other—hundreds of millions of individual firearms were circulating in 
the world, most of them in private hands. It is in the realm of communications, however, 
that technological developments most dramatically enhanced terrorist tactics. Radio, 
television, and communications satellites gave terrorists the ability to reach an audience 
of global proportions almost instantaneously, and this provided them with enormous power 
and great incentives.
TERRORISM HAS INCREASED IN VOLUME
Since 1970, terrorism has increased in volume and has become increasingly international. 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland 
The primary purpose of most 
terrorist operations was to affect 
perceptions. Terrorism was aimed 
at the people watching.
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The Evolving Nature of the Terrorist Threat
recorded 157,522 incidents of terrorism, with a total of 351,428 fatalities, between 1970 
and 2015. For 2015 alone, the GTD shows 14,807 incidents of terrorism worldwide (down 
from 16,804 incidents in 2014).4 This compares with an annual average of 984 incidents 
in the 1970s; 3,116 in the 1980s; 3,058 in the 1990s; and 2,499 between 2000 and 2009.5 
The dramatic increase in terrorism worldwide, 
however, is misleading. Outside of conflict 
zones, where terrorist campaigns comprise 
merely one aspect of ongoing wars, terrorist 
attacks occur only occasionally. Although 
terrorists carried out attacks in more than a 
hundred countries between 2001 and 2015, 
just ten countries accounted for 73 percent of all recorded terrorist attacks and 75 percent 
of all fatalities. This high proportion of terrorist activity reflects long-running insurgencies in 
Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, Thailand, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, and 
Colombia. Forty-six percent of the incidents, accounting for more than 50 percent of the 
fatalities, took place in just three countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—all of which 
were engulfed in intense ongoing armed conflicts. 
This conforms to a general historical pattern. Only 14 percent of all terrorist attacks since 
1970 have occurred in Europe. And if the data are confined to incidents with fatalities, the 
disparities between terrorism in and outside of conflict zones are even greater.6 
Although it includes only attacks on surface transportation—a popular terrorist target—the 
database maintained by MTI confirms this pattern. Between 1970 and the end of 2015, MTI 
counted 3,409 attacks on buses, passenger trains, and ferries worldwide. The countries 
of South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East account for about 70 percent of this 
total. The MTI database excludes incidents in active war zones, although it does report 
terrorist attacks in Pakistan. If Afghanistan and Iraq were included in the MTI database, 
these regions would account for a much higher percentage of the total number of attacks. 
European countries plus the United States and Canada account for only about 10 percent 
of attacks worldwide during this 45-year period. Clearly, the developing world experiences 
far more attacks. Moreover, according to the MTI database, attacks in South Asia are three 
to four times more lethal than those in Europe. 
The MTI database tracks the increase in terrorism worldwide along a trajectory similar to 
that seen in the GTD. The number of attacks trends upward from the 1970s to the turn of 
the century, then it levels off but remains well above the totals for the earlier decades. The 
GTD continues a sharper upward climb.
In other words, most recent terrorist incidents occur under conditions of armed conflict, 
i.e., ongoing wars. Terrorism increased from the 1970s on, but the dramatic increase in 
recent years is mostly a reflection of the fact that terrorism has become a distinguishable 
component of warfare and is now counted as a separate category of violence even during 
war. This makes historical comparisons and discerning long-term trends difficult. We have 
no idea how many incidents that would now be categorized as terrorist attacks occurred 
during World War II, the civil war in China, the Vietnam War, or the civil war in Lebanon—
Outside of conflict zones, where 
terrorist campaigns comprise merely 
one aspect of ongoing wars, terrorist 
attacks occur only occasionally.
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presumably there would be many. The increase appears all the more dramatic because 
the incidence of warfare itself and the casualties produced by war have declined during 
the same period. 
There are fewer wars and fewer casualties today than there were 50 years ago, and 
certainly fewer than there were in the bloody 
first half of the 20th century, when two world 
wars resulted in the deaths of approximately 
5 percent of the world’s population.7 Terrorism 
looms larger, in part because warfare itself 
has diminished, but also because terrorists 
have carried out more-spectacular attacks.
TERRORISTS HAVE ESCALATED THEIR VIOLENCE
In a world in which terrorist attacks were becoming increasingly commonplace, ever 
more spectacular acts of bloodshed were needed to achieve impact—increased terrorism 
created an inflationary effect that demanded terrorist escalation. The increasing role played 
by religious fanaticism as opposed to secular ideologies also drove terrorism into higher 
registers. Terrorists who claimed to be fighting for political goals—separate states or new 
societies—had to concern themselves with constituencies. Worries about alienating their 
claimed supporters imposed constraints on their violence. These self-imposed constraints 
eroded as terrorists escalated their violence in God’s name, although even religious 
fanatics worried that going too far could provoke damaging backlashes. 
New terrorist groups coming onto the scene seldom replicated the trajectory of their 
predecessors, who escalated from mostly symbolic to more-lethal attacks. The new 
terrorist groups did not start over at the bottom rung but began their campaigns using 
the most recent tactics and operating at the prevailing level of violence—they began with 
killings—and from there escalated even further than their predecessors. As a result, even 
though a number of the earlier terrorist groups were destroyed, the new, more-violent 
groups pushed the overall lethality of terrorist violence upward. 
The GTD provides a sense of this escalation. In the 1970s, the average number of fatalities 
per terrorist incident was 0.72. This rose to an average of 2.19 fatalities per terrorist incident 
in the 1980s, which rose to 2.26 in the 1990s, and to 2.91 from 2000 to 2009, dropping 
back to 2.19 for the six-year period from 2010 to 2015.8 While these increases seem slight, 
they represent a more than threefold increase in lethality.
A better idea of the escalation can be gained by looking at the incidents with the most 
fatalities. The bloodiest incidents of terrorism in the 1970s produced tens of fatalities. 
This ascended to hundreds of fatalities in the bloodiest terrorist incidents in the 1980s. On 
September 11, 2001, the number ascended to thousands of fatalities. This represented 
an order-of-magnitude increase every 15 years, leading to post-9/11 extrapolations that 
forecast future terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, enabling them to kill tens of 
thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people. 
Terrorism looms larger, in part 
because warfare itself has diminished, 
but also because terrorists have 
carried out more-spectacular attacks.
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TERRORISTS NOW KILL MORE INDISCRIMINATELY
Killing in quantity means killing indiscriminately. As time went on, terrorists defined their 
enemies—and therefore those they considered legitimate targets—more broadly. This also 
turns out to be an easy way around security measures. Today’s terrorists are approaching 
what might be called “pure terrorism,” totally 
random violence, killing anyone—people dining 
at a restaurant, gathered to watch fireworks or 
a concert, or at a busy intersection—in order to 
make a political point. Blowing up or gunning 
down people at cafes is not entirely new. It is, 
however, increasingly the norm. 
TERRORISTS ARE MORE WILLING TO DIE CARRYING OUT THEIR ATTACKS 
The emergence of suicide attacks started another trend. Suicide attacks were a response 
to increased security and were intended to be a demonstration of fanatical commitment, 
which itself would cause fear. Initially employed by only a handful of groups, reflecting 
specific cultural norms or the creation of suicidal subcultures to imitate the assassins of 
the 11th century, the use of suicide attacks soon became widespread.
The GTD records the first terrorist suicide attack in 1981, although some prior attacks could 
be considered suicidal. It records 37 suicide attacks between 1981 and 1990 and 150 in 
the following decade (1991–2000). The total ascended to 1,706 in the years between 
2001 and 2010, and for the five years from 2011 to 2015, the GTD records a total of 2,878 
suicide attacks.9
However, the distribution of these attacks underscores the point made earlier that terrorism 
is a specific component of contemporary warfare. Of the 2,878 suicide terrorist attacks 
that took place between 2011 and 2015, 2,402 (or 83 percent of them) occurred in just six 
countries: Iraq (1,034), Afghanistan (682), Pakistan (217), Syria (203), Nigeria (203), and 
Yemen (63). Suicide attacks have become a routine tactic of primarily, but not exclusively, 
jihadist warfare.10 
The MTI database shows a similar increase in suicide attacks on surface-transportation 
targets. The first recorded suicide attack on surface transportation occurred in 1993. For 
the decade between 1991 and 2000, there were 22 such attacks; between 2001 and 2010, 
there were 82; and there were 65 between 2011 and 2015. The much lower totals than 
those in the GTD again reflect MTI’s deliberate exclusion of war zones and the fact that 
MTI’s database encompasses a much narrower target set.11 
Suicide attacks comprise only a tiny portion of the total attacks on surface transportation. 
However, if the 1,919 total attacks between 
2011 and 2015 in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria 
are excluded from the GTD data, leaving 959 
suicide attacks in the countries included in the 
MTI database, then the 124 suicide attacks on 
Today’s terrorists are approaching 
what might be called “pure 
terrorism,” totally random violence.
Approximately one out of every 
eight suicide bombings has targeted 
public surface transportation.
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surface transportation represent 13 percent of the total number of suicide attacks against 
all targets. In other words, approximately one out of every eight suicide bombings has 
targeted public surface transportation. Caution is in order here, as the GTD data need to 
be more closely examined before a valid comparison can be made, but this finding does 
suggest a worrisome trend. 
TERRORIST GROUPS ARE OPERATING MORE GLOBALLY 
Analysts in the 1970s tried to anticipate the next terrorist weapon. Would terrorists use 
precision-guided weapons, remotely piloted vehicles, chemical or biological agents, 
possibly even nuclear weapons? The analysts, including me, failed to recognize, however, 
that terrorism is about communications, not battle. They did not include the Internet, which 
hardly existed then but which eventually enabled terrorist organizations to publicize their 
propaganda with little interference by censors or editors, to communicate with supporters 
and potential recruits worldwide, and to inspire and exhort others to carry out attacks in 
distant locations, thus enabling them to bypass border controls. While warfare declined 
in general, wars were more likely to include terrorist attacks that could occur anywhere in 
the world. 
In summary, then, terrorism in its current form emerged in the late 1960s, and by the mid-
1970s, terrorists had established their tactical repertoire. It has changed only incrementally 
since. The volume of terrorist attacks has increased dramatically since 1970, although 
much of this increase reflects better reporting and the fact that terrorism has become an 
increasingly routine component of warfare. Terrorists have also escalated their violence. 
Achieving the goal of large-scale casualties requires less-discriminate attacks, but 
changing terrorist motives and norms made this less of a problem for the terrorists. The 
adoption of suicide attacks on a wide scale has resulted in higher levels of lethality and 
has further added to public alarm. And terrorists are effectively exploiting the Internet to 
explain their cause, reach broader audiences, attract recruits, and create global networks. 
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III. HOW TERRORISM DIFFERS FROM CERTAIN FORMS OF 
CRIME AND OTHER MODES OF ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY
Terrorism poses novel problems for security planners. Terrorist attacks differ from more-
conventional modes of armed conflict and from other categories of violent crime. Unlike 
military units, terrorists do not have to attack certain targets in a specific time frame 
to achieve results. And unlike criminals who engage in armed robberies or burglaries, 
terrorists do not have to risk exposure by penetrating guarded facilities to get at some 
desired treasure. That gives terrorist attackers an inherent advantage. They can attack 
anything, anywhere, any time, while authorities cannot protect everything, everywhere, all 
the time. 
Terrorists do not organize into armies. They operate clandestinely, and they offer few clues 
about where they might attack next—despite intense intelligence efforts, surprises must 
be assumed. And the availability of virtually unlimited targets for terrorist attacks makes it 
difficult to decide where and how limited security resources should be allocated to protect 
the targets that terrorists might strike. 
Traditional threat assessments are based 
on analysis of the adversary’s intentions 
and capabilities, but these count less in 
predicting what terrorists might attack. 
Unconstrained in their choice of targets, 
terrorists can select any target within the 
range of their capabilities. 
Security planners have therefore been pushed toward vulnerability-based analyses. Instead 
of starting with what is known about the threat, vulnerability-based threat assessment 
starts by identifying potential targets—something that terrorists might attack, then positing 
a hypothetical terrorist foe, and outlining an invariably worst-case scenario. Vulnerability-
based analyses are useful in looking at the potential consequences of potential attacks and 
evaluating preparedness. They are not threat assessments, but they tend to be treated as 
if they described actual threats.
A further problem with vulnerability-based analysis begins with the word vulnerability itself. 
It concentrates the mind on the dire things that could happen—it is a victim’s perspective. 
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated America’s vulnerabilities. These attacks produced less 
death and destruction than was envisioned in Cold War imaginings of a nuclear attack, 
but 9/11 may have had greater visual impact because instead of the instant vaporization 
and incineration that comes with a nuclear explosion, the slow-motion collapse of the 
Twin Towers was observable and was watched by millions of people hundreds of times. 
Terrorist threats could be reduced and security could be increased, but the indelible sense 
of vulnerability created on 9/11 was recalled again and again in subsequent discussions of 
possible terrorist scenarios. 
Different terrorism scenarios compete for limited security resources. Advocates who 
are worried about a particular terrorist weapon or potential target set argue that the 
The availability of virtually unlimited 
targets for terrorist attacks makes it 
difficult to decide where and how limited 
security resources should be allocated.
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consequences of their particular scenario are worse than those of the other competing 
scenarios and hence deserve more attention and funding. In this debate, the catastrophic 
consequences of worst-case scenarios outweigh their probability of occurrence. The 
competition for security resources also involves bureaucrats who want to avoid any future 
culpability by being seen protecting their areas of responsibility. 
In a democracy, much of such discussion takes place in the public domain. The discussion 
itself inspires terrorists to think about whether they are actually capable of carrying out 
the imagined scenarios. Even if they are not, talking about these scenarios fulfills terrorist 
fantasies while we listen. Eavesdropping authorities may then interpret the terrorists’ 
discussions as confirmation of assumed intentions, thereby confirming their worst fears. 
The endless public discussion of dire terrorist 
schemes also contributes to public alarm. When 
Americans ask whether we are safer now, they 
are not seeking an objective measure, they 
want the feeling of vulnerability to go away. The 
continuing discussion of vulnerabilities ensures 
that it will not.
TERRORISTS ATTACK SOFT TARGETS
Another unique attribute of terrorism is its focus on soft targets. By definition, terrorist 
attacks are aimed at targets that ordinarily would not be attacked, according to the rules of 
war. However, within this category, some targets are better protected than others. Terrorists 
can obviate physical security measures by attacking unprotected targets—that is, they 
can attack unprotected civilians, and they can carry out armed assaults or plant bombs in 
locations where there is little or no surveillance, no security perimeters to penetrate, and 
few, if any, armed guards to respond. Recent terrorist targets have included churches, 
synagogues, mosques, schools, restaurants, theaters, markets, shops, apartment 
buildings, private homes, and public gatherings—some of which now have increased 
security, as a result of the terrorist attacks. Targets such as train tracks and pipelines can 
be bombed without risking encounters with security forces. Bombs and land mines can be 
planted on roads and detonated automatically or remotely.
Terrorists also can obviate security measures by employing tactics such as drive-by 
shootings, by tossing explosive or incendiary devices from cars, or by standoff attacks—
firing mortars or rockets at distant targets. Terrorists can set off bombs in the general vicinity 
of their target, leaving it to the media to make the connection. For example, detonating a 
bomb in the vicinity of an embassy or other government building or outside a corporate 
headquarters avoids security and incurs little risk to the bombers but achieves almost the 
same coverage as a bomb at the target itself. 
It is sometimes difficult to make judgments about how to categorize certain attacks on what 
appear to be harder targets—for example, when attackers approach security checkpoints 
and then open fire or detonate bombs. Such attackers recognize that security measures 
are in place or nearby and therefore know that they may be apprehended or killed in the 
encounter, but they still hope to cause casualties before they are neutralized. Security may 
When Americans ask whether we 
are safer now, they are not seeking 
an objective measure, they want the 
feeling of vulnerability to go away.
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prevent the attackers from getting to the actual target, but an attack still takes place, and 
the attempt itself is often portrayed as a terrorist success. 
A sample of 200 terrorist attacks recorded in the GTD gives us a rough idea of how often 
terrorists avoid security measures. One hundred incidents were selected at random from 
the period 1970–1979, and another hundred were selected at random from 2000–2009.12 
The incidents were sorted by target category and terrorist tactic. 
In the 1970–1979 period, terrorists in the sample attacked 84 unprotected targets—targets 
where there were no security perimeters and no guards. The targets included a theater, 
a restaurant, a union headquarters, a primary school, a university campus building, a 
synagogue, a post office, a bank, a bus station, and several corporate headquarters. Seven 
of the attacks would have required penetration of a target that was likely to have some 
form of security perimeter, not necessarily a daunting one, or would have exposed the 
attackers to a response by armed security personnel. Nine attacks had to be categorized 
as “unknown,” owing to a lack of information about security measures that may or may not 
have been in place. 
The results were similar for the randomly selected incidents in the 2000–2009 period: 
75 of the attacks involved unprotected targets, including churches, mosques, a 
synagogue, several schools, open-air markets, a bakery, a real-estate office, mobile-
phone shops, buses, tourists, railroad tracks, a pipeline, “near a hotel,” and “in the vicinity” 
of an embassy. Seventeen attacks involved some level of security, and eight fell into the 
unknown category.13 The higher number of attacks in which terrorists had to deal with 
security reflects increased reporting from war zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where 
terrorists often blew themselves up at security checkpoints. Whether attacks on military 
personnel or other security-force targets should be included in the definition of terrorism, 
even if they take the form of roadside or suicide bombings, is another issue. 
Although these numbers derive from a random sample and some of the events call for 
judgment, the overall pattern seems clear. In approximately 80 percent of the incidents, 
security measures were irrelevant because the terrorists attacked unprotected targets. 
Another observer might categorize a few of the incidents differently, but this would not be 
likely to change the overall conclusion. Security did not fail—it simply was not there. Nor 
is this to say that security is completely irrelevant 
to terrorism; it still affects terrorist decisions 
about what to attack or the tactics to employ. The 
fact that terrorists concentrated their attacks on 
unprotected targets, however, suggests that they 
avoided protected targets, and that in itself can be 
seen as evidence that security works. 
There are exceptions to the preference for soft targets. Some terrorists appear to remain 
obsessed with attacking certain target sets despite the increasing difficulties of doing so. 
Commercial aviation is one example. Although increased security measures have made 
it more difficult to smuggle weapons or bombs aboard airliners, terrorists continue to try 
to develop ways of getting past these measures. Wile terrorist hijackings have declined 
overall, as have sabotage attempts, some terrorists continue to try to smuggle bombs aboard 
In approximately 80 percent of the 
incidents, security measures were 
irrelevant because the terrorists 
attacked unprotected targets. 
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airliners either by building smaller, more easily concealed devices that can avoid detection 
or by utilizing inside accomplices. And even as attacks on airliners have declined, aviation 
remains in their sights, as terrorists have attacked airports and even airline ticket offices.
Faced with the “ring of steel,” an array of security measures put into place after the first 
major terrorist bombing in London’s financial district, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) built 
a huge truck bomb and patiently waited months for an opportunity to strike again. When 
security was altered to facilitate the passage of construction vehicles engaged in the 
project to repair the damage of the first bombing, the IRA promptly exploited the opening 
and struck a second time. 
Following a terrorist car bombing of a Marriott hotel in Jakarta, security at the property 
was significantly increased. The terrorists then prepared another large bomb, which they 
could have used against other hotels in Jakarta that had far less security. Instead, they 
employed an insider to set off two small bombs inside the lobbies of the JW Marriott 
hotel and the adjoining Ritz-Carlton hotel. Although easier target venues were available, 
and reportedly had a vehicle bomb ready to be used in an attack, the terrorists wanted 
to demonstrate they could overcome even the most stringent security measures. In their 
view, the prestige that the demonstration of determination and prowess would bring them 
was worth the added operational risk.14
TERRORIST ATTACKS ARE STATISTICALLY RARE AND RANDOM
While the volume of terrorism in the world has increased significantly and thousands 
of terrorist incidents now occur worldwide every year, causing casualties and property 
damage, terrorism still represents only a tiny fraction of the collective and individual 
violence in the world. Terrorist attacks remain statistically rare and random, especially 
outside of conflict zones. This is particularly true in the United States, where since 9/11, 
terrorists motivated by jihadist ideologies—the source of the principal terrorist threat over 
the past 15 years (although many people would argue that white supremacists and anti-
federal government extremists also pose a significant threat)—have killed fewer than 
100 persons, an average of six deaths a year. While every such death is a needless 
tragedy, this is a much better result than most people feared or expected immediately after 
9/11, and deaths from terrorist attacks represent only a tiny fraction of the approximately 
15,000 homicides that occur annually in the United States. 
That makes it hard to determine the right level of security. With risks to individual citizens 
and specific target sets so low, almost any expenditure on security against terrorism may 
appear extravagant. Critics of security are fond of pointing out that bee stings and spider 
bites pose a greater threat to Americans than terrorists do.15 This ignores the psychological 
consequences of terrorism, but the low level of violence also makes it nearly impossible to 
measure the amount of reduction in risk security 
brings—it cannot be significant because the 
totals are so low to begin with. Critics can easily 
lambaste security against terrorism as not worth 
the money, and certainly not worth the disruption 
and imposition on individual liberty. 
With risks to individual citizens and 
specific target sets so low, almost 
any expenditure on security against 
terrorism may appear extravagant.
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Including the 9/11 attacks, however, alters the calculation. Most people would agree that 
security should be in place to prevent another 9/11. But that is a single scenario—one 
that government officials stand accused of having failed to envision—and it would seem 
dangerous not to consider and protect against other scenarios of similar magnitude. That, 
however, puts security planning into the realm of imagination, where what drives security 
is not what terrorists have done, but rather, what terrorists conceivably might do in the 
future. In that realm, where are the boundaries? 
Security planners must deal with considerable uncertainty in assessing the terrorist threat 
and in calculating the appropriate response. What is the level of risk? How much security 
is enough? How far should security planners go in dealing with terrorist scenarios that are 
theoretically plausible but have not yet occurred? 
Terrorists, along with analysts trying to think as terrorists, can conjure up more scenarios 
of mayhem and mass destruction than those charged with security can take measures 
to protect against. The attacks on 9/11 fundamentally altered perceptions of plausibility. 
Scenarios that had been previously dismissed as far-fetched became operative 
presumptions the day after those attacks. 
Should the threshold for taking new security measures be that terrorists have already 
demonstrated their intentions and capabilities to carry out such attacks, perhaps more 
than once? If that is the case, security planners might risk another failure of imagination. 
And does it make a difference where and under what circumstances the precedents took 
place? For example, large-scale suicide attacks in a conflict zone like Afghanistan or Syria 
may not indicate that such attacks are just as likely in America or Europe, but, as we 
have seen in the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium and in terrorist plots in the United 
States, neither are they impossible. 
And preparing only for what has already happened makes security reactive. Many would 
argue that such a posture guarantees future security failures. Should the threshold instead 
be lowered to what we know terrorists have contemplated but not yet done? We know that 
many of the attacks terrorists have thought about are ambitious fantasies. Should terrorist 
scenarios be taken seriously by security 
planners if there is even a 1-percent chance 
of an actual attempt? (This was the so-called 
Cheney Doctrine.) 
Or should defenses be based upon what pundits can imagine? There is no agreement 
on how much attention and resources should be devoted to less-likely threats, but the 
pressure is on security to address everything, no matter what the odds, especially when 
the consequences are severe.
Devoting vast resources to events of uncertain probability but with potentially catastrophic 
consequences is not unique to terrorism. The United States spent vast sums on maintaining 
a huge nuclear arsenal during the Cold War because the threat of nuclear war was viewed 
as existential. Lesser wars were tolerable. In the case of terrorism, however, tolerance for 
failure is much lower. The fact that any terrorist attacks have occurred in the U.S. homeland 
Many of the attacks terrorists have 
thought about are ambitious fantasies.
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causes apprehension and outrage and further complicates security calculations. That is 
due to the nature of terrorism itself.
TERRORISM IS, ABOVE ALL, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Terrorism is defined as violence—actual or threatened—calculated to create fear and 
alarm, i.e., terror. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching. Its effects are, above all, 
psychological. The creation of terror causes people 
to exaggerate the importance of the terrorists 
and the threat they pose. Terrorism, therefore, is 
much more a matter of perceptions than of easily 
quantifiable risks or losses.
This observation has profound implications for security. To be successful in creating terror, 
terrorists do not have to directly defeat security measures. They rely not on their ability to 
defeat security, but on their ability to create terror. Terrorism—the actions of terrorists—
and terror—the psychological effects of terrorist actions—are separate domains. Even low 
levels of terrorism can (and do) produce high levels of alarm. Therefore, terrorists with 
limited capabilities and minimal resources can achieve major effects. 
This is especially true in the context of today’s media-drenched society. Media coverage, 
particularly visual media coverage, greatly extends the reach and effects of terrorism. 
If terrorism is theater, contemporary communications, through mass and social media, 
enable terrorists to reach an audience of global proportions almost instantaneously. The 
mass media also tend to increase the drama by repeatedly broadcasting the visuals that 
terrorists choreograph, by endless speculation about what could occur, and by mobilizing 
legions of talking heads to further discuss the matter—and in the discussions, those making 
the most dramatic claims, those describing worst-case scenarios, have an advantage over 
those counseling calm. 
Partisan politics further incentivize the creation of fear. Every terrorist incident is portrayed 
as a failure for which someone is to blame and heads must roll. Politicians pound podiums 
and point fingers. They demand that more be done to protect people. It is politically safer 
to support increases in security than to oppose them. Even those who see little utility in 
proposed measures risk condemnation for substandard zeal, for imperiling the lives of 
citizens if they do not agree and being pilloried if another attack occurs—any terrorist 
attack, which most likely will happen. And if security is therefore to be increased despite 
the uncertainty, it must be argued that the threat warrants an increase. In other words, 
fear drives security decisions that, once made, 
must be supported by a commensurate level of 
assumed threat, so security also drives threat 
portrayals. There is no point in diminishing the 
dragons one promises to slay.
By demanding and unrealistically expecting absolute security, the public contributes to 
its own fear. It encourages the government to overpromise what it can deliver, setting it 
up for failure, which will, in turn, exacerbate public alarm. Terrorism theoretically could 
Terrorism...is much more a 
matter of perceptions than of 
easily quantifiable risks or losses.
Every terrorist incident is portrayed 
as a failure for which someone is to 
blame and heads must roll.
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be attacked by reducing terror, that is, by 
fostering a psychologically less-vulnerable 
society, thereby reducing the ability of 
terrorists to create fear. However, appeals to 
courage, stoicism, and self-reliance, although 
these are considered traditional American 
attributes, have not been a major feature of 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
Terrorists do not have to succeed tactically to get media attention and create alarm. A terrorist 
bomb may fail to kill anyone—it may not even work—but its mere discovery can cause fear 
that there may be other undiscovered devices or that a determined person or group may 
succeed the next time. At a minimum, an attempted terrorist event will be viewed as a failure 
of security, which must then be increased to prevent further such events. 
There are numerous examples. In 2001, a terrorist attempted to detonate a bomb concealed 
in his shoe while aboard a U.S.-bound flight. The device failed to go off, and the bomber 
was quickly subdued, but the fact that security measures had failed to prevent him from 
boarding the flight resulted in the implementation of new screening measures at airports. 
In the United States, it led to the requirement for passengers to remove their shoes and 
place them on the conveyer, where they could be x-rayed. 
In 2006, British authorities uncovered a plot to smuggle liquid explosives on board airliners 
flying out of Heathrow Airport. The plot was foiled, but it nonetheless caused great concern 
and promptly led to restrictions on the amount of liquids passengers could carry.
In 2009, one of al Qaeda’s regional affiliates sent a Nigerian recruit with a small bomb 
concealed in his underpants to destroy an airliner flying from Amsterdam to Detroit. The 
terrorist managed to get on board with the device, but when he tried to ignite it, it did not 
work, and passengers quickly immobilized him. Despite the failure, the U.S. government 
responded by deploying body scanners at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars and 
implementing new, more-thorough pat-down procedures. 
Although they failed to bring down any airliners, the terrorists in all three of these cases 
achieved enormous psychological and economic effects, proving that results can be 
achieved independent of the actual loss of life or physical destruction, based solely upon 
perceptions of risk, which are distorted by fear and alarm and often exacerbated by public 
reactions and partisan politics. These examples also show that each new demonstrated 
terrorist capability requires an enormous financial outlay to counter the threat.
The jihadists clearly have discovered this 
and have recently modified their strategy to 
exploit these vulnerabilities. Jihadist rhetoric 
now urges followers to launch attacks, even 
if they are likely to fail, confident that public 
and political reactions will still provide a good 
return on their investment. 
Appeals to courage, stoicism, and self-
reliance, although these are considered 
traditional American attributes, have 
not been a major feature of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy.
Jihadist rhetoric now urges followers 
to launch attacks, even if they are 
likely to fail, confident that public and 
political reactions will still provide a 
good return on their investment.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
18
How Terrorism Differs from Certain Forms of Crime
All of this suggests that security measures should not consist solely of physical measures 
but should also address social consequences. For example, authorities might think more 
about how to create a more resilient society and a political environment that discourages 
rather than encourages overreaction.
This section has attempted to show that terrorists have significant advantages over 
security planners. Terrorist targets are unlimited, while it is impossible to protect everything. 
Terrorists obviate security measures by attacking soft, unprotected targets—indeed, most 
terrorist attacks are aimed at such targets. And while terrorism has increased in volume, 
it remains statistically rare and random, complicating calculations about the right level of 
security. On one hand, the risk to the individual citizen seems too low to justify massive 
security measures. On the other hand, authorities must anticipate and try to prevent low-
probability events that have potentially severe consequences. Public fear further distorts 
the process. Terrorists aim at gaining attention, causing alarm, and creating the apparent 
necessity of increasing disruptive and costly security measures, and they can succeed in 
doing so with low level attacks and even with foiled plots and failures. 
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IV. THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM FOR SECURITY
WHAT IS SECURITY SUPPOSED TO ACHIEVE?
Security against terrorism can be broadly defined to include everything a country does to 
protect its national interests and citizens against terrorist attacks abroad and at home—
foreign and domestic intelligence efforts, diplomacy, direct military operations and military 
assistance to allies, international and domestic law enforcement efforts, visitor and border 
controls, physical protection measures, and effective response to attacks that occur. 
Security is not just what government does, it also includes all of the security measures 
taken by the private sector to protect critical infrastructure, facilities, and people. While this 
report addresses only one aspect of security—the physical security measures in place to 
prevent successful terrorist attacks against specific targets—it is important to keep in mind 
that these measures are only one component of a broader national effort. Security can be 
intended to achieve a variety of goals, including those described below. 
Eliminate terrorist groups. Security against terrorism in the United States is a component 
of the federal government’s responsibility, as written in the U.S. Constitution, to provide for the 
common defense. However, there is a difference between providing for the national defense 
and protecting every citizen against attack. 
Terrorists make no distinction between front 
lines and home fronts, between combatants 
and noncombatants. Defending the nation 
does not mean guaranteeing no domestic 
casualties. 
The government’s active counterterrorism efforts are aimed at eliminating the terrorist 
groups that pose a threat to the nation’s security. But if it were possible to destroy all of 
the groups that might threaten the United States before they could mount any attack, 
there would be little need for security in any other form. Eliminating terrorist groups, like 
combating crime, however, is a difficult and enduring task. Victory in the traditional military 
sense may not be achievable. 
Deter terrorists from attempting attacks. Security measures can succeed by deterring 
adversaries from attempting to carry out attacks. In the Cold War, the risk of retaliation 
discouraged the Soviet Union (and the United States) from using nuclear weapons. Deterring 
terrorists works differently. Retaliation may have a deterrent effect in some cases, but 
deterrence against terrorist attacks through protective measures alone requires deploying 
levels of security that come close to guaranteeing operational failure by any attacker. 
Passenger screening at airports is an example. Security at this level requires significant 
resources, causes inconvenience, and even then does not guarantee absolute prevention. 
Uncover and thwart terrorist plots. Intelligence efforts to uncover and thwart terrorist 
plots play a major role in counterterrorism security. U.S. authorities have had remarkable 
success in interrupting terrorist plots. It is likely that not all of the plots uncovered would 
have resulted in attacks had they not been discovered, but some would have. The ability 
of the authorities to penetrate terrorist conspiracies and bring would-be terrorists to justice 
may also contribute to a deterrent effect.
There is a difference between providing 
for the national defense and protecting 
every citizen against attack.
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At the same time, domestic intelligence efforts, while effective, are controversial. In some 
cases, they are seen to pose threats to individual liberties. Perceptions of necessity and 
public tolerance depend on levels of fear, which are highly subjective. In a democracy, this 
will always be a source of tension—I would add, as it should be.
Prevent successful attacks. When deterrence and intelligence have failed, physical 
security measures are the last line of defense. They aim at detecting and promptly 
neutralizing any attack before the terrorists can reach their intended target and carry out 
their mission. This is important to remember when evaluating these measures. In most 
cases, they come into play as a response to a terrorist operation that has begun. In other 
words, the attackers are there, driving toward their target, climbing over the fence, coming 
through the door, or at a security checkpoint, with weapons or explosives. The news media 
and some critics portray even attempted terrorist attacks, whether or not the attackers 
succeed, as security failures. In the broadest sense, these events are failures of some 
aspect of security, but not necessarily because the security measures surrounding the 
target failed. 
Reduce the consequences of terrorist attacks. Measures to mitigate casualties, damage, 
and disruption should be included in a broad definition of security. Aviation security is 
front-loaded—it invests heavily in prevention. Failure to prevent attacks on airliners allows 
little mitigation. When a plane is taken over by hijackers, hundreds will be in peril and 
may be killed. Prevention of attacks on public surface transportation is more difficult. The 
volumes of passengers, requirements for access, need for speed, and cost considerations 
limit what realistically can be done to keep terrorists away from the target. Surface-
transportation security is more heavily back-loaded, comprising measures such as design 
and construction features aimed at 
mitigating the effects of explosions, 
facilitating easy surveillance and 
rapid response, making evacuation 
easier, and rapidly restoring service 
to minimize disruption. Much more 
emphasis in recent years is being 
placed on resilience, which is itself a 
recognition of the limits of prevention.
The focus in this report is on security more narrowly defined, that is, the physical and 
procedural measures in place to prevent successful terrorist attacks against specific 
targets. Again, the emphasis is on empirical evidence of the effects and effectiveness of 
these measures.
HOW MUCH DOES THE UNITED STATES SPEND ON SECURITY AGAINST 
TERRORISM?
It is difficult to calculate exactly how much is spent in the United States on security against 
terrorism. If the total costs of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere 
are included in a counterterrorist budget, the figure ascends to the trillions of dollars. That 
is not what we are looking at. What we want to know is how much federal, state, and local 
Prevention of attacks on public surface 
transportation is more difficult. The volumes 
of passengers, requirements for access, need 
for speed, and cost considerations limit what 
realistically can be done.
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governments and the private sector spend 
on domestic security measures against 
terrorism. The difficulties here are in 
compiling total expenditures and in trying to 
separate the incremental costs of security 
against terrorism from the costs of security 
against ordinary crime and other threats. 
Federal expenditures to provide security against terrorism are not simply synonymous 
with the budget of the Department of Homeland Security. That budget covers activities that 
would continue if there were no terrorist threat—customs and border patrol, presidential 
protection, response to natural disasters, etc. At the same time, other federal agencies also 
spend money on protection against terrorism. A total budget for security against terrorism 
would include these incremental expenditures of all federal agencies. 
An analysis of such expenditures, mandated by Congress, concluded that not counting 
the costs of intelligence or military operations, the federal government spent a little over 
$72 billion on homeland security specifically aimed at terrorism in fiscal year 2015.16 The 
analysis breaks the expenditures down into three broad categories: programs to disrupt 
and prevent terrorist attacks ($35 billion); programs to protect the American people, critical 
infrastructure, and key resources ($26 billion); and programs in place to respond to and 
recover from incidents ($11 billion). Excluding recovery costs, the $61 billion for the first 
two programs would approximate the federal budget for security against terrorism.17
It is more difficult to calculate how much state and local governments are spending to 
secure their jurisdictions specifically against terrorism. A study by RAND researchers 
published in 2008 estimated those state expenditures at $1 billion to $2 billion a year (not 
counting federal grants) and private sector expenditures at $5 billion plus another $5 billion 
in added insurance costs.18 A 2011 study estimated that spending for security against 
terrorism by state and local governments and the private sector totaled $100 billion for the 
decade after 9/11, or approximately $10 billion a 
year.19 (It is not clear whether this figure includes 
incremental insurance costs.) Adding state and 
local expenditures to the federal government 
expenditures results in a total estimate of 
somewhere between $67 billion and $71 billion 
a year. Is security against terrorist attacks, which 
can never prevent all attacks, worth it?
At a glance, this would seem to be an easy question to answer. The country has invested 
heavily in homeland security and is safer now. In fact, in terms of terrorist activity in the 
United States, the years since the 9/11 attacks have been the most tranquil since the 1960s, 
when terrorism in its contemporary form first emerged as a threat. Whether Americans 
think they are safer from terrorism is a different question.
Most Americans tend not to recall that during the 1970s, the United States experienced an 
average of 50 to 60 bombings a year. These were carried out by a variety of mostly terrorist 
What we want to know is how much 
federal, state, and local governments 
and the private sector spend on domestic 
security measures against terrorism.
Adding state and local expenditures 
to the federal government 
expenditures results in a total 
estimate of somewhere between 
$67 billion and $71 billion a year.
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groups (leftwing extremists like the Weather Underground and New World Liberation 
Front, white and black supremacist groups, Puerto Rican separatists, anti-Castro Cuban 
extremist groups, Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Jewish Defense League, Croatian 
separatists, and others). 
In the more than 15 years since the 9/11 attacks, terrorists inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology 
of violent jihad or that of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have carried out 
16 attacks in the United States. Seven of these cases resulted in fatalities.20 Six attacks 
were by lone gunmen and resulted in 70 fatalities. In two of the attacks, two shooters 
were involved. These include the 2015 shooting in Garland, Texas, in which only the 
assailants were killed, and the shooting in San Bernardino, which resulted in 14 deaths, 
not counting the assailants who were later killed in a shootout with police. Three attacks 
involved attempted bombings. One of these, the bombing in Boston in 2013, killed three 
people (during their escape, the bombers also killed a policeman, the fourth fatality, and 
wounded another policeman who died months later as a consequence of his injuries, 
which counts as a fifth fatality in the case), bringing the total of fatalities in this period to 89. 
Three attacks involved stabbings or an assault with a hatchet, and two involved ramming 
cars into pedestrians.21 Attacks categorized as hate crimes but not terrorism—a blurry 
boundary separates the two—would add a few more to the total. 
Several of the events categorized as acts of terrorism are controversial. Some would 
argue that Nidal Hasan’s killing of 13 people at Fort Hood, TX, should not be categorized 
as an act of terrorism, but rather as the violent acting out of a disturbed individual, even 
though there is evidence of his correspondence with a known al Qaeda leader. The federal 
government considered that attack to be an act of workplace violence, which it certainly 
was, but it can also be seen as a politically motivated attack. (I would put it in the terrorism 
column.) The attacker in an incident in Chattanooga, TN, had a history of mental problems 
and substance abuse. A mentally disturbed individual who has looked at a terrorist website 
or claimed allegiance to a distant group cannot automatically be labeled a terrorist. Adding 
or subtracting a handful of cases, however, does not change the fact that these are very 
small numbers.
CAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BE APPLIED TO SECURITY AGAINST 
TERRORISM?
Have the visible security measures that are so prevalent in the landscape prevented 
more terrorist attacks? Intelligence operations clearly have been successful. Federal 
investigators and local police have uncovered and thwarted more than 80 percent of the 
jihadist terrorist plots in the United States. This is not to claim that every interrupted plot 
would have resulted in an attack had authorities not intervened, but some certainly would 
have. Whether the physical measures in place have reduced the risk of terrorist attack is 
more difficult to determine. The empirical evidence is slender. 
Critics of the current security regime argue that the terrorist threat to the United States 
is overblown. In their view, the risks involved are simply too low to justify the massive 
outlays in security. Cost-benefit analysis, these critics argue, shows that “in order to be 
deemed cost-effective [these measures] … would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect 
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against 1,667 otherwise successful Times-
Square-type attacks per year, or more than four 
per day.”22 (The Times Square attack refers to 
the attempted bombing of New York’s Times 
Square by Faisal Shahzad in 2010 in which 
Shazad’s device failed to detonate and no one 
was killed.)
The 9/11 attacks have thus far proved to be a statistical outlier, not an indicator of many 
more large-scale attacks to come, yet government officials continue to focus on worst-case 
scenarios and neglect probabilities. However, officials focus on worst-case scenarios, not 
because they overestimate the likelihood of such scenarios, which, in fact, is unknowable, 
but because the potential catastrophic consequences assumed in the worst cases 
overwhelm all other variables. And consequences are almost invariably calculated on the 
basis of worst-case scenarios. In some analyses, consequences are deliberately weighted 
to count more than threat. The result is that the consequences of an event overwhelm the 
probability of its occurrence, particularly when that probability is very remote. Essentially, 
risk calculations are consequence-driven. 
Officials also focus on higher-register events as the appropriate realm of federal 
government activity. Government officials are not convinced that they can prevent the 
lower-level attacks carried out by individuals or tiny conspiracies, but failure to stop every 
low-level attack will not bring down the republic, while failure to stop an attack on the scale 
of 9/11 could have devastating psychological, economic, and political consequences for 
the nation.
Government officials, however, operate under enormous public and political pressure to 
prevent all attacks. They are hardly allowed to manage risk; expectations are too high. 
Again, defense of the nation—a government’s 
primary duty—does not mean guaranteeing the 
security of every individual. In this regard, the 
public’s expectations are unrealistic, and the 
government is pushed to overpromise security. 
Cost-benefit analysis also fails to fully appreciate the role of terror. Casualties cannot be 
the sole currency of exchange. Deaths from terrorist attacks have far greater psychological 
effect than those resulting from other forms of violent crime that have, unfortunately, 
become common occurrences. Homicides in the United States currently number about 
15,000 a year, down from 24,000–25,000 a year in the early 1990s. This decline would 
allow three attacks a year on the scale of 9/11 without raising the overall risk of violent 
death at the hands of an individual. But one 9/11-scale event a year probably would imperil 
America’s democracy. Overreaction, fueled by intense and often lurid media coverage 
and political partisanship, also guarantees that even smaller-scale events will achieve 
disproportionate effects. 
Cost-benefit analysis is useful in forcing officials to articulate their presumptions and 
make explicit tradeoffs. In my view, while accepting that resources are not unlimited and 
Critics of the current security regime 
argue that the terrorist threat to the 
United States is overblown.
Government officials...operate 
under enormous public and political 
pressure to prevent all attacks.
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therefore choices have to include cost 
considerations, cost-benefit analysis 
cannot be dispositive in determining 
security measures—almost none would 
be considered worth it. These comments 
will no doubt provoke a vigorous response. 
SECURITY ENCOMPASSES A CATALOG OF MEASURES 
Security comprises a broad array of laws, technology, and procedures calculated to 
reduce terrorist capabilities, detect potential terrorist attacks, impede terrorist operations, 
and facilitate prompt response. The basic concepts of security have not changed since 
the Middle Ages, but the continuing challenge of crime and the new challenge of terrorism 
have produced some dramatic changes in responses since 1970. Closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) surveillance systems have become ubiquitous in public areas, especially in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. These are now backed up by sophisticated 
computerized analytics that can detect aberrations from normal patterns of activity and 
signal alarms. 
The threat of terrorist kidnappings spawned a personal protection industry that provided 
armored cars, chauffeurs trained in defensive driving, armed bodyguards, kidnap and 
ransom insurance policies, and hostage recovery consultants. 
Bombings, the most frequent terrorist tactic, have pushed the development and deployment 
of explosives-detection systems. Bombings also have encouraged the proliferation of inner 
perimeters protected by access control systems. Imaging systems capable of detecting 
concealed weapons or explosives have been greatly improved. Advances are being 
made in remote detection. Terrorist use of large, vehicle-borne explosives has led to the 
widespread erection of physical barriers and the development of blast-resistant materials 
for construction and glazing. Embassies are now built for defense.
Advances in information technology have enabled data from multiple sources to be 
aggregated and analyzed to detect suspicious activity and track suspects. The growing 
capacity of information systems to monitor, collect, store, retrieve, and mechanically 
analyze vast amounts of data about individual citizens and use those data to detect 
suspicious individuals and behavior is controversial. Behavioral detection is a more recent 
and even more controversial addition to 
security measures. Current behavioral-
detection efforts depend on individual 
training, but new systems based solely 
on technology are under development. 
Recent decades have also seen institutional developments. Intelligence efforts have 
been refocused and expanded enormously, especially in the United States since 9/11 and 
increasingly in Europe in the wake of recent terrorist attacks, despite much stricter privacy 
laws. New laws have been passed to facilitate intelligence collection and broaden police 
powers. In some countries, periods of preventive detention have been lengthened and 
new administrative controls like house arrest have been imposed. In an effort to reduce 
Cost-benefit analysis cannot be dispositive 
in determining security measures—almost 
none would be considered worth it.
Current behavioral-detection efforts depend 
on individual training, but new systems based 
solely on technology are under development.
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radicalization and recruitment to terrorist ranks, controls have been imposed on speech 
and Internet communications. What the law considers to be incitement has been expanded. 
Efforts to better understand and counter violent extremism are being increased. 
While much of security remains a private sector responsibility, the continuing terrorist 
threat has led governments to play a larger role in disseminating best security practices, 
mandating minimum security requirements, and, in some cases, directly implementing 
security measures—as, for example, in airline passenger screening in the United States. 
In response to the threat that terrorists may attack anywhere, members of the public have 
been mobilized to bring suspicious behavior or objects to the attention of the authorities. 
This measure is discussed later. 
Although these measures do not in themselves “catch” terrorists, each contributes directly 
and indirectly to security. A brief description of counterterrorism security measures and 
how they came about and are intended to work is given below. 
Intelligence. Although intelligence efforts are separate from the physical security measures 
discussed here, they warrant mention. Following 9/11, the United States devoted an 
enormous effort to improving its foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities. Information-
sharing and coordination were increased. The U.S. effort was assisted by unprecedented 
cooperation among intelligence services and law enforcement organizations worldwide. 
While still not optimal, domestic intelligence has also greatly improved and has achieved 
a remarkable record in preventing terrorist attacks, although some of the investigations 
and prosecutions have caused concern from the perspective of civil liberties.23 Intelligence 
is the first line of defense and has become the most effective component of the overall 
security effort. 
Watch lists. Watch lists are used to identify potential terrorists and deny them access; the 
lists have grown dramatically since 9/11. Connecting and consolidating the various lists 
and making them instantly accessible to appropriate users has been a major achievement. 
The U.S. government’s central database of known or suspected international terrorists 
(which may include U.S. citizens operating under direction from abroad), the Terrorist 
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), reportedly includes more than a million names. 
The FBI maintains a smaller list of suspects in its Terrorist Screening Database, which, in 
turn, is used to compile specific lists such as the no-fly list. These watch lists now guide 
security efforts, although they remain controversial.
Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS). Watch lists are 
intelligence-based. CAPPS is behavior-based. CAPPS was introduced to aviation security 
in the 1990s, following the recommendation of the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security. CAPPS analyzes the information available in the Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) that is created when a traveler books a flight, according to an algorithm 
that ranks the passenger according to potential risk. It is a mathematical application of the 
approach initially developed by Israel’s El Al Airlines for passenger pre-screening, which 
was based on a review of passenger information and sometimes intensive interviews 
with passengers prior to boarding. (El Al had the advantage of comparatively few flights 
and a unique passenger composition that made it easy to determine that the bulk of its 
passengers posed little or no risk.)
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Larger passenger loads (currently an average of more than two million airline boardings 
a day in the United State), a more diverse passenger composition, and greater sensitivity 
to what appears to be any sort of profiling—in violation of civil liberties—made the Israeli 
model inapplicable in the United States. A less-subjective, mathematically based screening 
system was considered more acceptable, especially when the system was designed to 
randomly add passengers, thereby guaranteeing that passengers selected for additional 
scrutiny would not be treated as suspects; it also made the system more difficult for 
potential adversaries to game. 
The airline industry opposed the introduction of CAPPS on grounds that it initially required 
selected passengers to be taken directly to security, where they would be subjected to 
additional screening, slowing down the screening process overall. Its implementation 
was modified to make a selection by CAPPS relevant only for the passengers’ checked 
baggage. A selectee’s baggage had to be inspected. Therefore, when CAPPS identified 
more than half of the hijackers on the morning of September 11, 2001, it had no effect 
on their screening. An improved system called CAPPS II was proposed by the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in 2003 but was opposed by civil libertarians 
and blocked by Congress. The initiative was terminated by President George W. Bush in 
August 2004.
Although some airlines still use CAPPS or variations of the systme and pass the 
information on to TSA, the United States has moved away from CAPPS toward what 
is believed to be a more efficient method of assessing passenger risk by adopting 
Pre-Check, a program that uses information known about passengers—often frequent 
flyers, government employees, and others who are assumed to pose little or no risk—to 
allow them to be screened rapidly at a pre-9/11 level, thereby allowing airport screeners 
to devote more attention to the other passengers. 
Random screening. Given the high volumes of passengers and other limiting factors, 
an aviation model of security cannot realistically be adopted for surface transportation. 
However, a number of transportation operators have adopted random passenger screening 
in which some of the passengers entering a train or subway station are mathematically 
selected for inspection. Obviously 
not as thorough as 100-percent 
screening, random screening offers 
some deterrent value and provides 
a platform and training to conduct 
more-rigorous screening should 
that be considered necessary on 
the basis of intelligence.24 
An MTI study of selective passenger screening concluded that selective searches theoretically 
can contribute to deterrence, oblige terrorists to take greater risks, complicate their planning, 
and potentially divert them to less-lucrative venues. The study made no attempt to quantify 
these effects. It noted that the introduction of any passenger-screening program, especially 
one that involves selection, runs against Americans’ preference for security that is passive 
and egalitarian, and therefore screening programs must be carefully planned and closely 
Random screening offers some deterrent 
value and provides a platform and training to 
conduct more-rigorous screening should that be 
considered necessary on the basis of intelligence.
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managed to reduce the inevitable allegations of discrimination or profiling based upon race 
or ethnicity. The study warned that legal challenges should be anticipated. 
Public surveillance. Public surveillance includes CCTV, license-plate readers, facial-
recognition systems, and other technology to identify persons, verify identity, detect 
suspicious behavior, diagnose situations, identify and track down escaping attackers, 
and prosecute offenders. CCTV provided security authorities with additional eyes and 
greatly expanded their ability to remotely monitor larger areas. The use of cameras for 
law enforcement purposes started in the United Kingdom in 1986 with the deployment 
of three cameras intended to be used for crime prevention. In response to the IRA 
terrorist campaign, the United Kingdom eventually deployed thousands of cameras in the 
Underground and on streets. 
The first CCTV cameras were costly and crude, but subsequent generations were cheaper 
and provided better images. Operators also were able to pan areas under surveillance, tilt 
the cameras, and zoom in on items of interest. Camera surveillance enabled authorities to 
diagnose situations and identify individuals of interest, eventually achieving a sufficiently 
high resolution for forensic use in prosecutions.
The problem of monitoring thousands of cameras was eased by the development of analytics 
built into the software. Alarms on perimeters or at portals immediately brought images 
from those cameras onto the display panel. Cameras could be programmed to watch for 
movement where there was not supposed to be any or the absence of movement (e.g., 
abandoned parcels) where there was supposed to be some. As the analytics improved, 
cameras became smarter and were able to train themselves. The system would watch 
for days, identify patterns, and then report anomalies—vehicles going the wrong way or 
arriving at a time when there were usually none. The most recent systems embed the 
analytical capability in the camera itself, making it, in effect, a computer with a lens.25
The notion that people are constantly under surveillance has raised civil-liberty concerns. 
But is CCTV effective in reducing crime? Critics charge that law enforcement exaggerates 
the utility of CCTV and that, in fact, CCTV has proved to be of little or no utility in crime 
reduction—they claim that, at most, it merely moves crime from heavily surveilled areas 
to areas with fewer cameras. However, a number of studies carried out in the United 
Kingdom—which probably has the highest number of cameras per capita of any nation—
Sweden, and elsewhere conclude that CCTV does make a modest, but significant 
contribution to crime reduction. It appears to have some deterrent effect in specific areas 
such as enclosed environments, public 
transport, and, most of all, car parks.26 
The significant reduction in vehicle crimes 
in car parking lots, however, also may be 
due to better lighting and fencing. 
CCTV also facilitates rapid analysis of situations and interventions. The paucity of camera 
coverage in Tokyo’s subways limited the authorities’ ability to rapidly diagnose the situation 
and identify some type of poisonous gas as the source of an attack with nerve gas in 1995. 
Since that time, the deployment of CCTV cameras in Japan has proved extremely helpful 
in identifying and apprehending criminals.
A number of studies...conclude that CCTV 
does make a modest, but significant 
contribution to crime reduction.
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It is more difficult to assess the effects of CCTV on terrorism, because of the low volume of 
terrorist activity. The terrorists planning the bombing of a New York subway station in 2004 
were aware of CCTV coverage and tried to disguise themselves in a way that would not 
attract attention; CCTV did not deter their attack.27 The terrorists carrying nerve gas into 
the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the 2005 suicide bombers in London were photographed 
entering the stations. As would be expected, CCTV does not deter suicide attackers.
However, British authorities were able to use video footage to ascertain that the 2005 
bombing in London was a suicide attack—there were no attackers still at large. In 2006, 
terrorists planted bombs in two suitcases and left them on German trains. The devices failed 
to detonate. German authorities quickly located video footage of the two with their suitcases 
entering a train station and published their photos on national television. Fearing arrest, one 
fled the country, and the other was quickly apprehended. In the 2013 bombing in Boston, 
investigators quickly assembled footage from public and private surveillance cameras and 
were able to publish blurry photos of two suspects within three days. This put the attackers 
on the run, preventing them from carrying out more attacks that they had planned.28 
Disarming terrorists. A number of laws and other controls aim at preventing terrorists from 
easily acquiring weapons and explosives and at facilitating subsequent investigations. 
Dynamite was readily available for purchase with little scrutiny in the United States in 
the 1970s. During that decade, the country experienced hundreds of bombings a year. 
Some of these were related to labor disputes or activities by organized crime; in many 
cases, dynamiting was simply a means of settling personal scores. But a significant 
number fell in the category of terrorist bombings. Since then, security at places where 
explosives are stored and controls on the purchase of explosives have increased. 
Commercial sources of the ingredients 
of improvised explosives are also more 
cognizant of unusual purchases. Although 
still possible, it is far more difficult now to 
acquire explosives or significant quantities 
of chemical ingredients that may be used 
in explosives without attracting attention. 
Controlling access to guns in the United States has been more difficult. Denying the 
right to acquire firearms (considered by many to be a basic right guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution) solely on the basis of suspicion is opposed by gun-rights advocates and 
even by some civil libertarians who are less enthusiastic about private gun ownership but 
who consider any restrictions without due process a threat to individual freedom. Some 
restrictions have been placed on assault-style weapons and large-capacity magazines. 
Those arguing for greater gun controls have to concede that terrorists in Europe, where 
gun ownership is far more restricted than it is in the United States, have been able to utilize 
their access to criminal networks to obtain fully automatic weapons like those used in the 
devastating November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. 
A major problem is the volume of weapons. Weapons are widely manufactured, and most 
of the world’s 875 million small arms are reportedly already in civilian hands.29 Moreover, 
rifles and pistols can be used for decades. Large quantities of military-design weapons like 
It is far more difficult now to acquire 
explosives or significant quantities of 
chemical ingredients that may be used in 
explosives without attracting attention.
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AK-47s are transferred from war zone to war zone. Commercially available non-automatic 
versions of automatic weapons can easily be converted to fully automatic operability, 
although that is not necessary for to carry out mass killings. In 2016, the terrorist shooter 
at a crowded nightclub in Orlando, FL, used a commercially available semi-automatic rifle 
to kill 49 people and wound 53 others. In 2017, the terrorist shooter at a crowded nightclub 
in Istanbul used a fully automatic AK-47 to kill 39 people and injure 70. 
Small-arms ammunition can be traced through a stamp on the cartridge base, which follows 
an international standard. This stamp indicates the manufacturer and year manufactured, 
and some stamps also allow the facility selling the ammunition to be identified. These 
stamps can be an investigative tool, but, again, the problem is volume—7 billion to 
10 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition are sold annually in the United States alone.30 
In response to the numerous terrorist and other criminal bombings in the 1970s, the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms sponsored research on taggants. These were materials—
microscopic tags—that could be added to commercial explosives at the time of manufacture 
and would assist in the prevention and investigation of bombings. Detection taggants were 
designed to signal the presence of explosives to various detection devices. Identification 
taggants were microscopic objects—for example, tiny spheres—which would survive an 
explosion and could be easily recovered afterwards by investigators. In one such technology, 
multiple layers of colors in a microscopic sphere would provide a code that identified the 
manufacturer and, with proper bookkeeping, the record of the material as it passed through 
the hands of distributors and merchants down to its purchase or theft.31
Although the technology was available, many questions remained about feasibility, safety, 
costs, and ultimate effects, as explosive devices could be improvised with a variety of 
materials. Gun-rights advocates also voiced objections, since some gun owners purchased 
gunpowder to load their own shells. Ultimately, the huge volumes of explosives used and 
the costs of the technology and record keeping killed the idea of using taggants. In 2014, 
for example, the United States used more than 3 million tons of commercial explosives 
(primarily ammonium-nitrate based).32 
Governments have placed restrictions on the use of ammonium-nitrate fertilizers, which 
are regularly used as an explosive ingredient when mixed with diesel fuel in large truck 
bombs like the one used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. In some countries, sale of 
the fertilizer is banned. Several proposals have been made to add ingredients that render 
the material less explosive. 
Detection technology. Systems for finding weapons, explosives, or the presence 
of dangerous chemicals have been installed at airports and train stations, on city 
thoroughfares, and at checkpoints. Metal detectors and x-ray machines have been used 
to screen passengers at airports for more than 40 years. In addition to metal detectors, 
screening checkpoints now have full-body scanners that detect not only metal, but other 
objects and even perspiration. Different technologies have been developed that improve 
the images provided by the x-ray machines. Objects of different densities are displayed, 
and the operator can view objects from different angles and zoom in on items of interest. 
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Airliner sabotage accelerated efforts to develop reliable explosives-detection technology. 
A major impediment to aviation security was the need for a system that could rapidly 
examine large volumes of objects quickly, with a near-zero false-negative rate and a 
low false-positive rate. The President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism 
(1989–1990), convened after the 1988 sabotage of PanAm flight 103 in which 270 
people were killed (11 of whom were on the ground), recommended that the Federal 
Aviation Administration foster the development of explosives-detection technology;33 
however, a subsequent review by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
recommended that deployment of existing systems be delayed because promising 
technological developments were expected to soon produce more-reliable systems.34 
Following the 1996 crash of TWA flight 800, which was at first suspected to have been 
caused by a bomb, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (1996–
1997) recommended the deployment of the new systems.35 The airline industry generally 
opposed this recommendation, and it was not until after 9/11 that the federal government 
mandated that all baggage be screened. 
New systems using a variety of technologies have been deployed to detect explosives. 
Bulk detection focuses on imaging characteristics. Trace detection relies on detecting tiny 
amounts of vapors emitted by explosive compounds. In addition to the technologies in 
development or in use, canines are still effective in detecting tiny quantities of chemical 
vapors. More recently, dogs have been trained to detect vapor wakes; that is, instead of 
sniffing persons or objects, dogs may be able to detect vapor trails by sniffing the air that 
somebody carrying a bomb has walked through. 
More recent efforts have aimed at stand-off detection, that is, detecting explosives carried in 
vehicles or on persons at a distance sufficient to allow early intervention. Some behavioral 
techniques to detect suicide bombers are in place now, and new technology allows operators 
to detect an individual carrying a bomb in a crowd. The tactical challenge is how to defuse 
the threat without increasing the danger to people in the surrounding area. 
Police, soldiers, and guards. Visible (and undercover) security personnel have been 
deployed to deter terrorist attacks, detect suspicious behavior, and provide an immediate 
response if an attack does occur. In response to the growing threat of random attacks, 
officials in London launched a program called “Project Servator” in 2014. The program 
consists of new policing tactics involving a highly visible but unpredictable police presence, 
behavioral-detection techniques, and random checks to deter and detect criminal and 
terrorist activity and to reassure the general public. 
Anecdotal information indicates that the presence of police or security personnel can have 
a deterrent effect. The heavy presence of police and other security personnel in the Paris 
Metro and commuter train stations following a bombing at an underground station in 1995 
appears to have persuaded the terrorists, who were still at large, to place their bombs at 
the entrance to the station or select other targets where they were less likely to encounter 
security personnel. In the 2006 attempt to bomb commuter trains in Germany discussed 
earlier, the bombers had planned to carry their suitcases containing bombs on an earlier 
date but decided to delay their attempt when they saw that the train stations were filled 
with police—the German government had deployed the added personnel to protect the 
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World Cup matches then taking place. The terrorists placed their bombs on the trains at 
a later date. Fortunately, the devices malfunctioned and no explosions occurred.36 In the 
November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, three bombers who intended to enter a football 
stadium were prevented from doing so by a single security guard. The bombers detonated 
their devices outside of the stadium, killing only themselves.37 
Inner perimeters and access control. Terrorism contributed to the proliferation of inner 
perimeters protected by access-control systems designed to prevent terrorist access to 
specific facilities or zones. In medieval times, castles restricted the flow of visitors through 
barbicans—narrow passageways to funnel visitors (or attackers) through obstacles and 
“dangers” controlled by the defenders—gatehouses, and portcullises, all manned by 
armed guards. Over time, the technology has changed. Advanced access-control systems 
with locked doors, turnstiles, badges, and card keys became increasingly common in the 
1960s as a response to crime. Terrorist bombs, often placed at corporate headquarters in 
the 1970s, led to the acceleration of access control in the subsequent years. Some type of 
access control is now in place at most federal government buildings and many corporate 
offices, commercial properties, and residences. More-advanced security systems use 
biometrics to ascertain identity.
Zone defense and “rings of steel.” The difficulty of protecting soft targets in cities led 
to the implementation of zone defenses, or so-called “rings of steel.” These are intended 
to deny terrorist access to entire zones of a city. The first ”ring of steel” was created 
in the 1970s in response to the IRA bombing campaign in Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
Between 1970 and 1975, 1,800 bombs destroyed 300 business establishments in the 
city, comprising one-quarter of the commercial floor space. In 1972, Belfast’s commercial 
center was surrounded by a fence, which shoppers could enter through checkpoints where 
parcels were inspected for bombs. Vehicle access 
and parking were restricted. In 1974, the fence 
was replaced by a more elaborate and permanent 
array of defenses. Gradually, the IRA shifted its 
sights to other targets. The barriers were gradually 
removed, and the security measures were relaxed 
in the 1980s, but a centralized CCTV system was 
implemented in 1995.
In 1992, a massive truck bomb detonated by the IRA destroyed the Baltic Exchange 
building in London’s financial district. Three people were killed, and the bomb caused 
$1.2 billion in damage. This led to the imposition of new security measures, including 
roadblocks and vehicle checks. When these measures were relaxed in 1993 to facilitate 
the flow of construction vehicles involved in rebuilding the Exchange, the IRA struck a 
second time, bombing the Bishopsgate area, killing one person and causing $1.5 billion in 
damage. In response to this attack, a “ring of steel” was erected around the city. Vehicular 
access to the city was sharply restricted, entering vehicles were searched at checkpoints, 
and CCTV was installed at every checkpoint. A “collar zone” consisting of increased 
police presence and random checks surrounded the “ring of steel.” These measures were 
gradually reduced after the IRA agreed to end its terrorist campaign in 1998, but they were 
reactivated after 9/11. The current system, which is referred to as the “ring of glass,” relies 
The difficulty of protecting 
soft targets in cities led to the 
implementation of zone defenses, 
or so-called “rings of steel.”
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more on domain awareness achieved through CCTV coverage and a heightened police 
presence. The “ring of steel” did halt further bombings within the city of London, but IRA 
terrorists carried out large-scale bombings outside the ring and in other British cities.
In response to the Second Intifada, the terrorist campaign that resulted in thousands of 
terrorist attacks and more than a thousand Israeli deaths between 2001 and 2008, Israel 
initiated a number of extraordinary security measures, including starting construction of a 
security barrier—a wall that would be 790 kilometers long if completed. This barrier has 
made infiltration by terrorist bombers much more difficult, but some Israeli officials credit 
the decline in bombings to the effective actions of the Israeli intelligence services, which 
infiltrated the terrorist groups and disrupted their operations.
The devastating economic impact of the 9/11 attacks and fears that major financial 
institutions would relocate to other areas, resulting in loss of tax revenues and high 
unemployment, prompted New York City to create the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative. 
Authorities judged this to be more efficient than trying to protect individual properties. New 
York’s “ring of steel” was, in fact, a “ring of glass,” more surveillance than physical barriers. 
Although it included some traffic restrictions and checkpoints, it consisted primarily of 
several thousand security cameras, license-plate readers, facial-recognition technology, 
and sensors to detect explosives, chemicals, biological pathogens, and radiation; it was 
supported by the latest analytical technology, 
aimed at rapid detection, diagnosis, and disruption 
of possible terrorist attacks. Additional checkpoints 
and other security measures monitored vehicles 
coming into Manhattan.
These special security zones have had some positive benefits. They may have had some 
deterrent effect, at least diverting attackers to other, less-strategic targets away from city 
centers. They protect vital commercial institutions and activities. They have arrested or 
reversed declines in retail commerce owing to insecurity. They probably persuaded some 
corporations and retail commerce not to relocate, thereby saving population, jobs, and 
revenue. (Economists may argue that relocation would replicate the jobs and revenue 
elsewhere.) Finally, they have created safe environments for residents and workers—
many feel that they have reduced traffic and increased a sense of security. 
The role of illusion. Critics sometimes dismiss security measures as nothing more than 
show, but what may appear to critics to be a charade may not be assessed the same 
way by terrorist operatives who look not at the imperfections, but at the remaining risk. 
The shortcomings of a security regime may be obvious, but terrorists who may have 
only one chance to succeed and for whom the 
consequences of failure are significant may view 
even a low risk of detection as too dangerous. 
Security measures are designed to affect the 
perceptions and calculations of the attacker as 
much as they are to prevent an actual attack. 
New York’s “ring of steel” was, 
in fact, a “ring of glass,” more 
surveillance than physical barriers.
What may appear to critics to be 
a charade may not be assessed the 
same way by terrorist operatives.
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Design features and construction materials. The use of specific design features and 
construction materials is aimed at strengthening structures against catastrophic failure, 
mitigating casualties, and facilitating surveillance and evacuation. In April 1983, a truck 
bomb destroyed the American embassy in Beirut. The Iraqi and French embassies in 
Beirut already had been the targets of previous vehicle bombs in 1981 and 1982. The 
Beirut attack was followed by a suicide terrorist bombing of the American embassy in 
Kuwait in December 1983, and the French embassy there was bombed the same day. In 
1984, terrorists bombed the American embassy annex building north of Beirut. In response 
to these bombings, barricades were hastily erected around buildings in Washington, D.C., 
and dump trucks were parked at the gates on the driveways into the White House. The 
Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (the Inman Panel, named after 
its chairman, Admiral Bobby Inman), convened in 1985 to review the security of diplomatic 
personnel and facilities overseas, made a number of recommendations, including a 
massive rebuilding program to improve the security of American diplomatic facilities.38 
At the same time, the U.S. Department of State convened a Committee on Research for 
the Embassy of the Future. The committee’s charge was to establish new design and 
construction specifications for diplomatic facilities abroad. The major challenge was that 
of dealing with massive truck bombs. To withstand the blast effects of some the largest 
truck bombs would require the construction of World War II–era fortifications, which was 
impractical. Instead, the committee recommended setbacks from thoroughfares and 
construction of barriers to keep explosions at a distance; however, these actions were not 
always possible in urban areas. Combinations of setbacks and more-robust construction 
techniques and materials could mitigate the effects of large truck bombs, but residual risks 
would remain.39
Terrorist bombings gave impetus to research that led to further improvements in building 
materials and especially in glazing (explosions could turn windows into deadly shards 
of flying glass). Engineers developed sophisticated computer programs to measure the 
effects of different types and weights of explosives at varying distances. In some cases, 
windows were deemed impractical. A 187-foot concrete base was added to One World 
Trade Center—the Freedom Tower, which replaced the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center—to diminish possible casualties from shockwaves that would ascend the structure 
from a bomb at street level.
Prior to 9/11, public surface-transportation operators gave little attention to crime prevention 
through environmental design (CPTED), but a survey conducted in 2005 indicated that 
80 percent of operators believe that CPTED can play a useful role.40 New train-station 
construction in the United States and Europe features open spaces that facilitate 
surveillance, reduce the effects of explosions, and eliminate sources of shrapnel.41
Enlisting the public’s help. Public-awareness campaigns that enlist the public to “see 
something, say something” are a logical response to random terrorism. They have existed 
in their current form for 25 years. Faced with IRA attacks on public transportation, British 
authorities sought the assistance of staff and passengers in identifying suspicious objects. 
The IRA’s terrorist campaign imposed a staggering burden on transportation security and 
a nervous public. Between 1991 and 1997, there were 41 IRA attacks on transportation 
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targets in England involving 81 devices and 29 explosions. In addition, there were 6,569 
telephone bomb threats. Of the 81 explosive devices placed at transport targets, 79 were 
hand-placed time bombs, 50 percent of which did not work as intended. Altogether, only 
three people were killed by IRA bombs on the rail system: one at Victoria Station in 1991 
and two on the Docklands Light Railway in 1996. This low number of casualties, however, 
is not due solely to the great pains taken by the terrorists to avoid casualties. Without a 
prompt response to threats, the death toll could have been much higher. Killing, however, 
was seldom the IRA’s primary objective.42
Public involvement was critical to the security strategy in England, despite its limitations 
and the risks of false alarms, especially immediately following terrorist attacks. Signage 
and repeated public announcements kept the public alert to the terrorist threat and to the 
need to keep personal packages under direct control, to remain vigilant for left parcels, and 
to immediately report suspicious activity or articles to staff. The police remained confident 
that any left parcels would be discovered in minutes, and because most IRA bombs were 
set with an hour or more on the timer, police would have time to respond.
It was not enough to merely advise the public to be vigilant. Passengers had to have a 
readily available means of communication—this was an era before people carried mobile 
phones. British Transport established “help points,” telephones, and emergency alarms. 
Passengers were instructed about what constituted an emergency and were encouraged 
to use the help points and alarms when appropriate. CCTV cameras covered the help 
points and alarms so that staff could see who was calling and why. The third essential 
ingredient was visible response. Passengers notifying the authorities could not be ignored, 
but had to see some action in response to their concerns. Between 1991 and 1997, 9,430 
suspicious objects were reported and investigated. The Underground and railroads also 
had to deal with more than a quarter-million lost or abandoned items every year, any one 
of which might have been a bomb.43
This is one of the few security measures for which it is possible to quantify results. Using 
the MTI database, researchers looked at worldwide patterns in attacks aimed against 
buses, trains, and passenger ferries and found that in 300 incidents—just under 9 percent 
of all attacks on these targets—alert citizens, passengers, or officials thwarted an attack by 
discovering bombs before they could be detonated. In approximately 43 percent of these 
cases, the individual who found the device 
was not identified. But in about 17 percent of 
the incidents, the device was found by alert 
passengers or citizens; in about 13 percent, 
the device was discovered by security or 
intelligence officials; in about 15 percent, 
military or police found the device; and in 
about 11 percent, the device was discovered 
by alert transit drivers, crew, or employees.44 
The same pattern generally holds in Europe, where a slightly higher percentage of 
attacks—11 percent—were foiled because bombs were detected. In 51 percent of these 
discoveries, the original source of information that prompted action is unknown. Where 
In 300 incidents—just under 9 percent 
of all attacks on these targets—
citizens, passengers, or officials 
thwarted an attack by discovering 
bombs before they could be detonated.
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more data are available, it is known that transit employees and drivers found devices in 
20 percent of the prevented attacks, passengers and citizens found them in 12 percent 
of the attacks, security officials or intelligence found them in 7 percent, and police found 
them in 10 percent.45
Turning, finally, to the 12 attacks on surface transportation in Canada and the United 
States, three (25 percent of the incidents—the highest percentage so far, although the 
number is very small) involved devices that were found before detonation. One was found 
in a passenger train, one in a subway station, and one in a train station. In the train-station 
case, in 1992, a maintenance worker found a grenade.46
Toward earlier intervention. Is it possible to push back the moment of detection of terrorist 
intent, enabling earlier intervention? This is a quest of current research. It focuses on the 
narrow time frame between the final commitment to action when the armed perpetrator 
is on the way or already at the selected target and poised to attack and the attack itself. 
Faced with a campaign of suicide bombings, Israeli security personnel were trained to 
watch for telltale signs of dress or comportment that indicated a possible suicide bomber. 
Since many of the bombs were being detonated on crowded buses, Israeli bus drivers 
were instructed about suspicious behavior to watch for as they approached bus stops and 
when to drive by rather than risk boarding a bomber.47
Behavioral detection operates on the premise that subtle indicators of possible criminal 
intentions—displays of nervousness or apprehension, for example—can be detected 
by trained observers. Skillful intervention, even a casual approach, may trigger further 
indicators. However, this is a controversial area. In 2013, the Government Accountability 
Office found that there was no evidence to back up the idea that “behavioral indicators 
… can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security.” After 
analyzing hundreds of scientific studies, the investigators concluded that “the human 
ability to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral indicators is the 
same as or slightly better than chance.”48
Critics charge that behavioral detection works only because it is thinly disguised racial 
profiling—more African Americans, Hispanics, and persons of Middle Eastern appearance 
are stopped because it is believed that they are more likely to have outstanding warrants or 
immigration violations or be carrying drugs or weapons. This contention gained credence 
when some behavioral-detection officers at Boston’s Logan Airport, where a pilot program 
was being tested, complained that co-workers resorted to racial profiling to improve their 
numbers.49 Others disagree, arguing that when properly used, behavioral detection is a 
legitimate and useful technique. 
New technology offers a mechanical approaches. A subject checking in at a kiosk may 
receive a subliminal prompt—an image or phrase—designed to provoke an emotional 
reaction that is then assessed by an embedded camera photographing the subject. Other 
research efforts are combing video footage of criminal assaults to see if there are telltale 
patterns of behavior just prior to the assault that could be programmed into surveillance 
cameras and used to alert police. 
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Whether they actually work or not, behavioral-detection efforts may have some deterrent 
effect. Long before airline passenger screening was implemented, U.S. authorities claimed 
to have the ability to identify would-be hijackers. They did not have that ability, but some 
potential hijackers believed that they did. There is no way to know how many hijackings 
may have been deterred by this tactic. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
37
V. DOES SECURITY WORK?
Shoplifting is a crime that occurs frequently, and new technology allows inventory shrinkage 
to be monitored easily and measured accurately. That offers a reliable base line. As a 
result, the effects of security measures involving CCTV or electronic merchandise tags 
can be rapidly determined, and calculations even can be made about how long it will 
take to amortize the cost of the system against the losses incurred. In contrast, it is much 
harder to keep score in the domain of terrorism. There are no easy metrics. 
SECURITY MEASURES BY THEMSELVES HAVE NOT REDUCED 
TERRORISM
There has been no reduction in the total volume of terrorism worldwide, nor is it reasonable 
to expect any. As indicated already, most terrorist activity is concentrated in conflict zones, 
where it is one dimension of ongoing warfare. Outside of these conflict zones, terrorist 
attacks occur only rarely. Going back to the statistics cited earlier, according to the GTD, 
in the past 15 years, roughly 27 percent of the world volume of terrorist activity—roughly 
23,000 incidents—took place outside of conflict zones. That sounds like a lot, but spread 
over 15 years, it comes to about 1,500 attacks a year. Divided by more than 100 countries 
where terrorist attacks have occurred, the average is about 15 attacks per country each 
year. If this is further divided by target sets 
to gauge the effects of different security 
regimes, the numbers are even smaller, and 
the effects may take decades to discern, 
making statistical analysis difficult.
In Europe and the United States, the volume of terrorist violence is generally lower than it 
was in the 1970s, although this decline is mainly the result of ending some of the armed 
struggles—in particular, the IRA’s 25-year terrorist campaign and a reduction of the Basque 
separatist violence in Spain—and the successful suppression of earlier terrorist groups 
such as the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe in 
France, and the Weather Underground and other neo-Marxist groups in the United States. 
Other groups have just disappeared. 
Better security and stricter controls on commercial explosives and the ingredients of 
improvised explosive devices have also contributed to the decline in the number of terrorist 
bombings, still the most common terrorist tactic. New laws have facilitated intelligence 
collection and broadened police powers, increasing the likelihood of identifying and 
apprehending perpetrators. 
The Palestinian organizations and their allies that were responsible for a number of 
terrorist attacks in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s were also gradually contained. Clearly, 
increased security made some of their favored tactics, e.g., airline hijackings and assaults 
on embassies, more difficult, but other factors also contributed to the decline. However,in 
the past 15 years, terrorists motivated by jihadist ideologies have carried out spectacular 
attacks in Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels, and Nice. The volume of attacks may be less 
than in the 1970s, but random targeting and the scale of carnage make these the main 
drivers of security today. 
The effects may take decades to discern, 
making statistical analysis difficult.
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The declines are often hard to demonstrate statistically, as the total numbers, especially 
of incidents with fatalities, are so low to begin with. In any graph, the line bumps along 
the bottom. Only when examined over the very long run—decades—does the trajectory 
become apparent.
In the 15 years between September 12, 2001, 
and December 31, 2016, homegrown terrorists 
inspired by jihadist ideology carried out only 
16 terrorist attacks in the United States; the 
number rises to a few dozen if attacks by other 
domestic extremists are added.50 This is not 
a complaint about a terrorism deficit. Having 
only two or three events a year is very good news for the country, but it makes an empirical 
evaluation of security measures difficult.
One way to measure the effectiveness of security against terrorism is to look at attempts 
by terrorists to directly overcome defenses by mobilizing more attackers, employing 
heavier weapons, or using suicide tactics. Escalation would indicate that terrorists were 
being forced to increase their investment. But terrorists launch very few direct assaults 
on defended targets outside of conflict zones. Resource constraints limit their ability. The 
growing volume of terrorism worldwide has not seen a parallel increase in the scale or 
intensity of armed confrontations with security forces other than those responding to attacks. 
The lack of examples of terrorists attempting to directly overcome security indicates that 
terrorists have ample easier options. Their attacks are aimed at killing as many civilians 
as possible before the terrorists themselves are surrounded and killed by security forces. 
The 2008 attack in Mumbai, the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, and the 2015 
attack in Paris are examples. 
There are also very few examples of terrorists employing heavier weapons. They rarely 
have access to weapons such as artillery or armored vehicles. Moreover, the requirement 
to operate clandestinely and to conceal their preparations works against the use of heavy 
weapons even if they had them. The terrorists would lose the element of surprise. Terrorists 
in the 1970s operated with readily available firearms and the arsenal of light infantry—
pistols, semi-automatic assault rifles, AK-47s. Today’s terrorists use the same weapons. 
One development apparent in earlier decades, however, was the increased use of standoff 
weapons, including mortars and rocket launchers, which enabled terrorists to engage 
their preferred targets at a distance without directly confronting security forces. Another 
development was the use of larger and larger truck bombs, which could be rammed 
through defenses by suicide drivers or could cause massive damage to a target even if 
detonated at a distance. 
Suicide attacks, which may be seen at least in part as a response to security, have become 
more prevalent and are now part of the terrorist repertoire in both Europe and, to a lesser 
degree, the United States. This is a response to security, but it also can be viewed as 
a security success of a sort, since suicide is a high threshold and suicide attackers are 
harder to recruit. 
Having only two or three events a year 
is very good news for the country, but 
it makes an empirical evaluation of 
security measures difficult.
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Again, as noted above, terrorists do not need to increase the size and weapons of their 
attacking force or their death wish to solve security problems. Terrorists do not double 
down and they rarely give up—they adapt. They can solve almost any security challenge 
by merely changing their target from one that is heavily defended to one that is hardly 
defended at all. That means that security measures are more likely to displace risk than 
to prevent an attack. Faced with security measures at a particular target, the determined 
terrorist selects another target. This generally has been the pattern.
One obvious measure of the effectiveness of security is missing. Almost no terrorist attackers 
are foiled at security perimeters. Airport screeners in the United States discover thousands 
of weapons forgotten or concealed in carry-on luggage, but they have not caught a single 
hijacker. They have discovered no bombs on would-be saboteurs. This is pretty much true 
worldwide. Very few terrorists are caught at perimeters or security checkpoints. But the 
question of how many terrorists have been caught by security measures may be irrelevant. 
The paucity of failed terrorist attempts (other than incidents of explosive devices that fail 
to detonate, which is a technical problem) 
suggests that terrorists determined to carry 
out an attack select tactics and targets that 
virtually guarantee success. 
MEASURES SHOULD PROVIDE A “NET SECURITY BENEFIT”
The ability of terrorists to select less-protected targets raises an important issue. In some 
circumstances, displacing the risk of a terrorist attack even temporarily is worthwhile. 
Important national and international events merit special security even without the 
expectation that it will prevent terrorist attacks elsewhere. But as a general rule, security 
measures, especially those that are disruptive or costly, should do more than merely move 
terrorists down the street. 
Commercial aviation is protected by extraordinary security measures for good reasons. 
Sabotage of an airliner in flight can result in hundreds of fatalities. A terrorist takeover of an 
airliner poses potentially even greater dangers. The 9/11 attacks offer the most compelling 
example. There is, therefore, a net security benefit 
to preventing weapons and explosives from being 
carried onto airplanes. Protecting nuclear facilities, 
dangerous materials, certain components of the 
infrastructure, and political leadership also offers 
net security benefits to society. 
Security in the public areas of airports is a different story. People at check-in and baggage-
arrival areas have been the targets of terrorist attacks, and security has been increased 
in some of these areas, but it is not clear that new security perimeters at the entrance to 
terminals offer much of a net security benefit. Screening at terminal entrances creates new 
bottlenecks; crowds waiting to get in become tempting targets.51
This can be seen in a terrorist attack in Turkey. In response to a heightened terrorist threat, 
a security checkpoint was erected at the entrance to Istanbul’s airport to screen passengers 
Almost no terrorist attackers are foiled 
at security perimeters.
There is...a net security benefit to 
preventing weapons and explosives 
from being carried onto airplanes.
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coming into the terminal. The original checkpoint inside the terminal continued to screen 
passengers before they boarded their flights. In June 2016, two terrorists opened fire as 
they reached the first security perimeter, killing 41 people and injuring more than 200. A 
third attacker detonated a bomb in the adjacent parking lot. In a sense, however, Istanbul’s 
security measures worked: Although the shooting at the front door was not prevented, it 
allowed passengers inside to flee—worse casualties might have occurred if the terrorists 
had been able to slip unnoticed into the busy terminal.52 Further terrorist attacks in the 
publicly accessible portions of airports no doubt will increase pressure to increase security 
in terminals, but it is a more difficult challenge than passenger screening. 
Crowds waiting to go through security checkpoints at train stations are also vulnerable, as 
demonstrated in a December 2013 terrorist attack in Volgograd, Russia, where a suicide 
bomber detonated his device just before the security checkpoint that had been installed at 
the entrance to a train station, killing 18 and injuring at least 44.53 
Finally, if deprived of the opportunity to attack airports and train stations, terrorists still 
have many other public places where an armed assault or explosion could achieve similar 
results—shopping malls, supermarkets, theaters, restaurants, nightclubs, tourist sites, 
busy streets, and other places of gathering. The security 
investment and the disruptions caused by attempting to 
secure these places would be significant, while the net 
gains would be slight. Another checkpoint cannot be the 
response to every attack in a public area.
SECURITY MEASURES ALSO SERVE FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN 
PREVENTION
While the ultimate purpose of security measures collectively is to deter or prevent attacks, 
not all such measures have a directly preventive function. Physical barriers may be designed 
to delay attackers and alert responders. CCTV surveillance may discourage criminal activity, 
but it does not prevent all attacks. Other measures facilitate surveillance or mitigate effects. 
Security measures work in concert, and it is difficult to judge the positive effects of any single 
one. Can we instead judge incidents where security has seemed to fail?
WHY DOES SECURITY SO OFTEN SEEM TO FAIL?
Almost every terrorist attack is seen as a failure of security. But this is hardly the right 
way to assess the effectiveness of security measures. As noted above, about 80 percent 
of the terrorist attacks to date have been directed against targets where there was no 
security. Security cannot be said to have failed where it does not exist. In roughly another 
10 percent of the attacks, the security circumstances are unknown. These are, to be sure, 
judgment calls based upon interpretation of a limited statistical sample of terrorist events, 
but it would appear that in only about 10 percent of the attacks did the attackers encounter 
some form of security. 
Terrorists rely upon stealth or surprise to succeed. In some cases, terrorists stormed their 
targets by force of arms or blew themselves up as they neared checkpoints, but most of 
Another checkpoint cannot 
be the response to every 
attack in a public area.
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these types of attacks took place in conflict zones and are not typical of terrorist attacks in 
other areas. This is an intriguing area worthy of further study.
TERRORISTS SUCCEED BY ATTACKING UNPROTECTED TARGETS AND 
BEING WILLING TO DIE
A closer look at the jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred in the United States in 
the past 15 years offers some insights into the issue of security failures. The 9/11 attacks 
reflect several failures. Intelligence indicated that al Qaeda’s terrorists were planning to do 
something, but the investigators were unable to identify the specific plot. They also failed 
to follow up on leads that would have led them to some of the attackers. Ten of the 19 
hijackers were identified by CAPPS and should have been subjected to extra scrutiny at 
the checkpoints. However, because of the way the system was configured, their selection 
by CAPPS had little operational meaning at the checkpoints. Whether the hijackers 
smuggled their weapons on board remains a matter of dispute. Passengers phoning from 
the hijacked flights mentioned box cutters, knives, and some form of Mace or pepper 
spray. The airlines have maintained that box cutters and knives with blades of the length 
the hijackers were known to have purchased were not prohibited. Others contend that they 
were. Any kind of Mace or pepper spray was clearly prohibited, but it is not proven that the 
terrorists had these items. The consensus view, however, is that passenger screening had 
clearly failed, so the federal government took over airline security.
Most of the jihadist terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11 have been shootings, 
and almost all of the victim deaths were the result of gunfire. Terrorist attacks with guns 
include the 2002 attack at LAX; the 2009 shootings at a military recruiting office in Little 
Rock, AR, and at Fort Hood, TX; the 2015 shootings in Chattanooga, TN, Garland, TX, and 
San Bernardino, CA; and the 2016 shooting of policemen in Philadelphia, PA, and at 
a nightclub in Orlando, FL. Several of the 
assailants had previously been on the radar 
or under surveillance as possible terrorist 
suspects, making their attacks a “failure” of 
intelligence, but thousands of people come 
onto the radar, while only a handful ever 
carry out attacks. Dangerousness is difficult 
to predict. 
In all of the shootings except for the one at Fort Hood, the assailants did not have to 
penetrate any security perimeters or pass through any checkpoints. They carried out 
their attacks in public places, although they could expect that there would be a rapid 
armed response, which did occur in almost every case. The shooters in Chattanooga, 
Garland, and Orlando were all taken under fire and killed at the scene. The attackers in 
San Bernardino were killed in a gun battle with police hours later. The attacker in 
Philadelphia was shot and wounded at the scene. At Fort Hood, the attacker was a senior 
army officer with identification who was able to enter the facility, where he opened fire on 
his fellow soldiers. He, too, was shot and wounded.
Most of the jihadist terrorist attacks in 
the United States since 9/11 have been 
shootings, and almost all of the victim 
deaths were the result of gunfire.
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Three of the attacks in the United States since 9/11 involved bombs: the 2010 attempted 
bombing in New York’s Time Square; the 2013 bombing in Boston, MA; and the 2016 
bombing in New York City. The New York City bomber had also placed an improvised 
explosive device in New Jersey, but it failed to detonate. The bombs were all placed in 
public areas, and all of the bombers were quickly identified and arrested or killed by police. 
In two of the remaining cases—in Merced, CA, in 2015, and St. Cloud, MN, in 2016—the 
attackers stabbed their victims; in another 2015 case, an assailant attacked policemen 
with a hatchet. In 2016, an attacker rammed his vehicle into pedestrians and then attacked 
them with a knife. In yet another incident, an individual simply rammed pedestrians with his 
automobile in 2006. Again, these attacks took place in public areas, although the attackers 
could expect an armed response—four were killed by police, and the fifth, the driver of the 
automobile in 2006—surrendered to authorities immediately after the attack.
In most of the cases, the prospect of 
immediate death did not deter the attackers. 
They succeeded not because of a failure of 
security, but because it was easy for them 
to attack unprotected civilians, and except 
for the bombers, most of the attackers were 
ready to die. That would seem to suggest 
that terrorists cannot be deterred, but there 
is evidence that indicates otherwise.
They succeeded not because of a failure 
of security, but because it was easy for 
them to attack unprotected civilians, 
and except for the bombers, most of the 
attackers were ready to die.
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VI. CAN TERRORISTS BE DETERRED? 
It is difficult to prove empirically that security has a deterrent effect. We cannot count 
events that don’t occur. The absence of attacks could be attributed to a deterrent effect or 
simply to the lack of any terrorist intentions to carry out such attacks. We cannot be sure 
which it is.
However, there is a growing body of research indicating that terrorists take security into 
account in their planning and that increased security appears to have contributed to altering 
certain tactics or deterring terrorist attacks against certain categories of targets.54 Terrorists 
may be ready to sacrifice their own lives, but they still seek operational success. Part of 
the allure of terrorism, and of violent jihadist ideologies in particular, is the opportunity 
to demonstrate not only commitment, but prowess in a warrior subculture. Dying in a 
failed attempt may still bring individual attackers posthumous rewards, but tactical failures 
accrue less prestige, and for the organization, strings of failed attacks hardly make effective 
recruiting posters. Even the most fanatical attackers want to do more than hurl themselves 
against impregnable walls in futile attempts to 
breach defenses. The following examples indicate 
that deterrence seems to have worked or at least 
contributed to a decline in the use of certain tactics 
or attacks on certain target sets. 
TERRORIST KIDNAPPINGS OF DIPLOMATS DECLINED AS TERRORISTS 
TURNED TO OTHER TARGETS
Terrorists began kidnapping diplomats in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, they began 
kidnapping corporate executives and demanding ransoms as a means of funding their 
operations. The kidnappings prompted increased security. Personal protection became 
a major industry involving armed bodyguards, armored cars, defensive driving courses, 
convoys of protection personnel, increased security at offices, and safe rooms at officials’ 
and executives’ homes, along with procedures to protect schedules and alter routes and 
times of travel. 
Terrorist kidnappings overall declined in the later 1970s and early 1980s, but they did not 
end. Increased security was a contributing factor, but not the only one. In many countries, 
the urban guerrilla and terrorist groups responsible for the early wave of kidnappings were 
suppressed. In countries unable to apprehend kidnappers or destroy kidnapping rings, 
kidnappings continued; both guerrilla groups and ordinary criminals participated in this 
lucrative criminal activity, especially in Latin America, where kidnappings increased in 
some countries. 
However, instead of targeting the better-protected diplomats and high-ranking political 
officials, the kidnappers shifted their sights and went after lower-level executives, relatives 
of prominent individuals, aid workers, missionaries, journalists, and others who had little 
or no protection. In this context, security worked. There were some striking exceptions, 
including the kidnappings of prominent German businessman Hanns-Martin Schleyer in 
1977, of Italy’s former prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978, of American General James 
Terrorists may be ready to 
sacrifice their own lives, but they 
still seek operational success.
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Dozier in Italy in 1981, and of a number of prominent Latin American business executives.55 
Another example—one that did not involve kidnapping—was the 1989 killing of Alfred 
Herrhausen, the head of Deutsche Bank. 
EMBASSY TAKEOVERS SOARED IN THE 1970S, THEN WERE ABANDONED 
AS A TACTIC 
In the early 1970s, terrorists began to seize hostages at embassies and other diplomatic 
facilities. These incidents differed from kidnappings in that the terrorists knew they would 
be promptly surrounded by police and military units, but they attempted to negotiate their 
escape along with the satisfaction of other demands in return for the release of their 
hostages. Throughout the decade, terrorist takeovers of embassies remained a prominent 
means of attracting international attention and exerting political coercion. Between 
1971 and 1981, terrorists seized hostages at embassies or other diplomatic facilities on 
43 occasions and unsuccessfully attempted to storm embassies on five more occasions. 
In addition, mobs sacked embassies numerous times, and unarmed protesters occupied 
them, holding hostages.
The tactic appeared contagious. The events occurred in clusters, increasing in the early 
1970s, reaching a plateau in the middle of the decade, then dipping before climbing sharply 
at the end of it. Then the tactic virtually disappeared. 
At least part of the decline probably was due to increased security. Embassies turned into 
virtual fortresses, while host governments increased surrounding security. The five failed 
attempts to seize hostages at embassies all occurred between 1976 and 1979, reflecting the 
effectiveness of increased security. Moreover, the countries whose embassies were the most 
prominent targets of terrorism during this period (Israel, the United States, and Germany) 
are underrepresented in the takeovers, suggesting that heavy security at these sites, which 
earlier had been prominent targets of terrorist attacks, encouraged would-be hostage-takers 
to target the embassies of other countries whose embassies were less protected.
Part of the decline also reflects what happened after the terrorists seized hostages. As the 
tactic proliferated, governments became increasingly resistant to meeting the demands 
of hostage-takers anywhere, either aboard hijacked airliners or inside embassies. The 
hostage-takers saw their demands fully or partially met in 40 percent of the cases in the 
first half of the decade; the proportion dropped to 25 percent in the second half. Terrorist 
demands were fully met in only 17 percent 
of the incidents. Evidence of increasing 
resistance to terrorist demands was also 
reflected in the growing length of the 
hostage standoffs.
As governments became more resistant to terrorist coercion, they also became more willing 
to use force to end hostage situations whenever possible. Armed rescues of hostages 
were made by French commandos in Djibouti in 1976, by Israeli commandos in Entebbe in 
1976, by German commandos in Mogadishu (where hostages were held aboard a hijacked 
airliner) in 1978, and by Egyptian commandos in Cyprus, also in 1978. An attempt by U.S. 
As the tactic proliferated, governments 
became increasingly resistant to meeting 
the demands of hostage-takers anywhere.
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forces to rescue American hostages held in Tehran in 1980 was aborted when a desert 
sandstorm disabled several of the helicopters carrying the rescue team. 
Host governments dealing with embassy takeovers remained reluctant to risk the lives 
of foreign diplomats held hostage. In an episode that was an operational and diplomatic 
disaster, protesters seized control of the Spanish embassy in Guatemala in 1980; despite 
pleas from the Spanish ambassador to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the incident, 
Guatemalan forces were ordered to attack. Thirty-six people, including both hostages 
and hostage-takers, died in a fire started during the assault. The ambassador narrowly 
escaped. Later in 1980, British commandos successfully stormed the Iranian embassy in 
London, which had been taken over by terrorists. 
Faced with the increasing prospect of encountering heavily armed guards, growing failure 
to achieve results beyond publicity, and the increased risk of death or capture, terrorists 
abandoned embassy takeovers. They did not abandon attacks on diplomatic facilities, 
however; they merely altered their tactics from takeovers to large-scale bombings.56
INCREASED SECURITY AND POST-9/11 PASSENGER REACTIONS HAVE 
MADE TERRORIST HIJACKINGS MORE DIFFICULT
Evidence of deterrence due to security can be found in long-term trends in terrorist hijackings 
and airline sabotage attempts. Aviation security remains one of the most important 
components of overall defense against terrorism. In the early 1970s, terrorist hijacking or 
bombing attempts worldwide were occurring, on average, at the rate of one every couple of 
months—and people still flew. Since then, the number of hijacking attempts has declined. 
There were 43 attempted hijackings in the 1970s, 26 in the 1980s, 16 in the 1990s, and 
19 between 2000 and 2009, including the four airliners hijacked on 9/11. We cannot 
claim that the 9/11 attacks were anything other than a terrorist success, but this success 
conceals the fact that it required four or five 
hijackers on each plane who were willing 
to commit suicide—19 in all. Recruiting 
that many suicide attackers poses a 
high threshold, beyond the capabilities 
of most terrorist organizations.57
The number of sabotage attempts has also declined. In the 1980s, there were 39 attempts 
to sabotage airliners. The number dropped to 15 in the 1990s, and to eight in the first 
decade of this century. Clearly, this was progress, although many factors were driving the 
decline. In part, the decline reflected the fact that there were fewer terrorist groups focused 
on aviation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, terrorist hijacking and sabotage attempts were 
being carried out by a number of Palestinian groups, Shi’ite and Sikh fanatics, Croatian 
separatists, Ethiopian extremists, Cubans waging war on Castro’s Cuba, and members of 
the Japanese Red Army and Germany’s Red Army Faction, as well as Libyan and North 
Korean agents. A number of these groups were eventually suppressed. Under intense 
global pressure, others, including the Palestinian organizations responsible for some of 
the most spectacular hijackings in the 1970s, were persuaded to abandon this tactic.
Evidence of deterrence due to security can 
be found in long-term trends in terrorist 
hijackings and airline sabotage attempts.
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Another reason for the decline in terrorist attempts against aviation was increasing security. 
Following the first terrorist hijacking of an El Al airliner in 1968, the Israeli government 
adopted the most stringent security measures of any airline. There have been no further 
hijackings of El Al airliners. Terrorists did not give up the tactic, however; they simply 
targeted other airlines. Yet, as the numbers indicate, these hijackings of also declined 
over time. Locked, armored cockpit doors and passengers willing to pounce on anyone 
threatening an airplane have rendered hijackings, if not obsolete, a far riskier tactic for 
terrorists and one with greater chances of failure. Hijackings today are more likely to 
involve mentally disturbed persons or individuals claiming to have explosive devices that 
are invariably hoaxes. 
While some critics may think airline security is a charade, and probes by government-
sponsored “red teams” have indicated unacceptable rates of failure that must be remedied, 
terrorists know that security still poses risks to attackers. Terrorists cannot simply march 
100 would-be martyrs toward security checkpoints, hoping some might get through. The 
risks of betrayal and failure are too great. 
Instead, they study security measures 
carefully to identify vulnerabilities they 
can exploit and ways to allay suspicion. 
Some of these work, but terrorists pay 
a price in quality control.
SABOTAGE OF AIRLINERS HAS DECLINED, AND SECURITY HAS LED TO 
LESS-RELIABLE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Although the number of terrorist attempts against airliners has declined, sabotage remains 
a serious threat, as evidenced by continuing plots and attempts to smuggle bombs on 
board. These include the 2001 failed attempt by the so-called “shoe bomber,” the sabotage 
of two jets in Russia by Chechen terrorists, the 2005 discovery of a bomb that had failed 
to explode aboard an airliner in Kazakhstan, the 2006 plot to smuggle liquid explosives 
aboard airliners departing from London’s Heathrow Airport, the 2009 sabotage by the 
“underwear bomber,” and the attempt in 2010 to smuggle bombs aboard two courier aircraft 
heading for the United States. Another terrorist plot to bring down an airliner was foiled 
by an intelligence operation in 2012. In 2015, terrorists downed a Russian airliner flying 
from Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport, and in 2016, a bomb exploded aboard 
a Daallo Airlines flight shortly after departing from Mogadishu, Somalia. Terrorist bombs 
are still getting through security. Four of these 11 incidents were foiled by intelligence 
operations, but in nine incidents, terrorists were able to smuggle their devices on board. 
Three of the devices (2001, 2005, and 2006) malfunctioned, and in the Daallo Airlines 
attack, the bomb failed to bring down the airliner, and only one passenger—the bomber 
himself—was killed. Bombs did bring down three airliners (two in 2004 and one in 2015), 
but the fact that terrorists are forced to build smaller, easier-to-hide devices with exotic 
ingredients and no metal parts, to make them less detectable, represents a kind of 
progress for security—the new devices are less reliable, and even if they detonate, they 
may not bring down the plane. The number of attempts suggest that improved security has 
discouraged but not deterred sabotage attempts; terrorist groups must now recruit suicide 
attackers and must have highly skilled bomb-makers whose devices may not always work. 
Terrorists cannot simply march 100 would-be 
martyrs toward security checkpoints, hoping 
some might get through.
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SECURITY HAS PUSHED TERRORISTS AWAY FROM HIGH-PROFILE 
TRANSPORTATION TARGETS
Terrorist campaigns against surface transportation also illustrate some deterrent effects 
of security. Early in its terrorist campaign, the IRA bombed railway and subway stations in 
the heart of London. These were prestige targets. As security measures protecting London 
Transport increased and members of the public became more vigilant, the terrorists were 
driven away from high-profile targets to more-remote sites.58 The terrorists who bombed the 
London Tube in 2005 avoided detection 
by carrying their bombs in backpacks 
rather than leaving them in unattended 
parcels. Transport staff and passengers 
had not been instructed to watch for 
backpacks, and moreover, it had been 
years since any terrorist attacks had 
targeted the transportation system. 
French authorities flooded the Paris Metro and commuter rail stations with soldiers and 
police following the 1995 detonation of a bomb in an underground station; the blast killed 
eight people and wounded 80. The terrorists continued their campaign but were obliged to 
go after other, less-protected targets.59
These case studies offer some observations. Insofar as we can tell, in no case did security 
measures lead to a reduction in the overall volume of terrorism. Terrorist campaigns continued, 
and globally, terrorism increased. But increased security contributed to terrorists gradually 
abandoning certain tactics and targets. They no longer tried to kidnap diplomats and other 
high-ranking officials, and they stopped trying to take over embassies. Over several decades, 
terrorist attacks on airliners declined. Terrorist saboteurs were able to overcome security 
measures by building smaller explosive devices that could escape detection, but these 
devices were less reliable. The terrorists moved 
away from more-protected surface-transportation 
targets to more-remote, less-protected locations or 
resorted to suicide bombings. Again, many other 
factors also help explain these changes.
In general, terrorists broadened their quarry in order to successfully attack softer targets. 
This required a change in mindset. In terrorist thinking, there were fewer “innocents.” We 
cannot say whether the rules of engagement changed in response to security measures 
that drove terrorists away from their initially preferred targets, as a reflection of changes in 
the ideologies driving terrorist behavior, or because of an inherent process of escalation 
and brutalization. 
The change comes at a cost to society in the form of more wanton killing at places where 
it is more difficult to prevent—and a cost to terrorist organizations in the form of eliminating 
any possibility of gaining widespread support, thereby further reducing their already thin 
chances of permanent political gain. Indiscriminate targeting also provokes debate and 
divisions in the ranks of the terrorist organizations. Terrorism ultimately descends into self-
indulgent violence that is politically irrelevant. 
As security measures protecting London 
Transport increased and members of the 
public became more vigilant, the terrorists 
were driven away from high-profile targets 
to more-remote sites.
Increased security contributed to 
terrorists gradually abandoning 
certain tactics and targets.
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VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This inquiry, still a work in progress, has distilled a number of observations and conclusions, 
which may be viewed as findings or even as security maxims. As a body, they illustrate the 
complexity of the challenges terrorists pose to security planners. These findings can be 
grouped into four major categories.
TERRORISM POSES A UNIQUE THREAT
The purpose of terrorism is terror: Terrorist actions are meant to inspire fear. Terrorists 
have limited resources and power—they lack the destructive capability of armies—but 
that level of capability is not necessary for their purpose. Terrorists have very low resource 
requirements. They do not require large forces to overwhelm enemy defenses; one 
determined attacker may suffice. The weapons terrorists need are readily available: small 
arms, crude explosives, incendiary devices, rudimentary 
weapons, even knives, axes, or automobiles. These suffice to 
achieve the terrorists’ primary objective, which is the creation 
of terror. 
Terrorists will always have a fundamental advantage over those charged with security: 
Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time. With finite resources, government 
cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time. The consequences of this obvious 
asymmetry are often ignored.
Terrorist attacks are increasing in volume worldwide, but they remain statistically rare and 
random. This poses an enormous challenge for determining how much security should be 
deployed and what to defend. 
Terrorists concentrate their attacks on soft targets that lack security. They generally attack 
where there are no perimeters, no checkpoints, no guards. This is particularly the case 
outside of conflict zones. 
Terrorists can try to overcome security measures by increasing the number of attackers, 
adding to their arsenal, carrying out suicide attacks, or recruiting inside assistance, but 
they rarely do so. This suggests that other paths—e.g., attacking softer targets—are 
easier. When terrorists take advantage of an insider, it is usually because one happens to 
be already available to them and not because of a targeted campaign to recruit an insider. 
Today’s violence seems to be headed toward what might be called “pure terrorism”—
totally random attacks, devoid of political message or symbolic content, calculated only 
to kill. This kind of terrorism is extremely difficult to prevent, but it limits what the terrorists 
may achieve politically. The notion of pure terrorism attracts self-selecting, marginal, and 
sometimes mentally disturbed individuals who are drawn to the violence itself. And pure 
terrorism alienates popular support. 
The prospects of capture or death do not necessarily have the same effect on terrorists that 
they do on others engaged in violent activities. Anecdotal accounts suggest that terrorists 
Terrorists have very low 
resource requirements.
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whose conversations are being monitored continue with their activities even when they 
know or suspect that they are under surveillance and are likely to be arrested. Their 
demonstrated commitment to their cause brings them credit for the group and personal 
satisfaction as a tactical achievement. At the same time, terrorists often seem to court 
unnecessary risk in their operations. This does not mean that they are always suicidal, but 
rather that they demonstrate their commitment and acquire status by deliberately exposing 
themselves to danger. 
ASSESSING THE RISK 
Terrorism works: The terrorist threat always appears greater than it actually is. By mounting 
spectacular acts of violence, terrorists create an atmosphere of fear and alarm—i.e., 
terror—which causes people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists and the threat 
they pose.
Terrorist communications cannot be ignored; the exhortations and instructions they provide 
to followers may persuade some to act. But their exhortations and threats are not always 
reliable indications of the level of threat or imminent action. The Internet allows terrorists to 
constantly threaten, boast, and exhort others to action. These communications constitute 
a major part of a campaign of terror, which, in turn, will cause people to exaggerate the 
importance of the terrorists and the threat 
they pose. We can say only that terrorism 
includes a high volume of noise and a very 
small amount of action.
Examining terrorist plots informs us about what the terrorists take into account and worry 
about in their planning but is of limited help in evaluating security measures. Terrorists 
continuously think about, plan, and talk about possible attacks. They are not soldiers actively 
engaged in combat. They have a great deal of downtime, and they spend it conjuring up 
plans—it is part of being a terrorist. Many of their plots, overheard during surveillance, 
discovered at terrorist hideouts, or revealed in interrogation, are self-indulgent fantasies. 
Security against terrorism is driven not only by what terrorists have done in the past, 
but also by what society fears they might do in the future. There are tensions here—
imagination of what terrorists might do drives public fear, while resource constraints 
limit security planners to defending against demonstrated attacks. The 9/11 attacks 
fundamentally altered perceptions of plausibility and prompted fears of attacks of even 
greater magnitude. Add to this the fact 
that the perceived consequences 
of a terrorist attack, more than the 
probability of its occurrence, determine 
the perceived risk and, consequently, 
the demand for security.
Terrorism does not pose a significant danger to individual citizens. Compared with other forms 
of violent crime, terrorism poses a statistically minuscule threat to the lives of individuals 
(the 9/11 attacks notwithstanding). The same disparity holds in countries that have lower 
Terrorism includes a high volume of 
noise and a very small amount of action.
Imagination of what terrorists might do 
drives public fear, while resource constraints 
limit security planners to defending against 
demonstrated attacks.
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crime rates than the United States but suffer higher levels of terrorist attacks. However, 
terrorist attacks on targets that appear to be random convey the message that no one is 
safe. Terrorists’ demonstration of reach outweighs the calibration of personal risk.
The primary threat of terrorism is to the community. In addition to causing casualties, terrorist 
attacks cause damage and economic disruption, create alarm, and oblige governments to 
devote vast resources to security. Terrorist attacks can prevent peace and provoke wars. 
These are significant costs. 
Terrorism appears to be a condenser of society’s broader anxieties. Fear is fueled not 
merely by the objective measure of risk, but by apprehension about the consequences 
of immigration, economic uncertainty, and perceived loss of national strength. America’s 
frightened, divided, and angry society is currently its biggest vulnerability. Europe is also 
experiencing deeply rooted anxieties that the current wave of terrorism is exacerbating.
Public expectations of security are rising even as the general level of violence is falling. 
Even though the level of terrorist violence in the United States since 9/11 is lower than 
that experienced during the 1970s and the 
murder rate is falling, frightened Americans 
are demanding more security. The reduction 
in risk to Western nations from war and 
violent crime has left terrorism as the high 
ground of threat.
Over the long run, public tolerance for any sort of risk appears to have declined. This offers 
an advantage to terrorists, whose primary purpose is the creation of fear.
Apprehension and intolerance for risk push authorities toward preventive intervention 
before terrorists launch an attack. New laws in the United States allow prosecution on the 
basis of intentions alone, thereby allowing authorities to intervene earlier and at the same 
time permitting more forward-leaning intelligence efforts. 
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY
Intelligence plays a critical role in preventing terrorist attacks. While domestic intelligence 
can be further improved, the success of federal investigators and local police in uncovering 
and thwarting plots in the United States has been remarkable. However, the numbers here 
are slippery. Most terrorist plots are interrupted in their early stages, making it difficult to 
judge whether they would ever have been carried out had the authorities not intervened. 
We can only say that some would.
Terrorists do not have to penetrate security perimeters to carry out their attacks. Public 
spaces—markets, squares, any crowded venue—serves as a terrorist target. Where the 
intended target has security, attacks can still occur outside perimeters. If an embassy’s 
grounds are impenetrable, shooting the security guards outside or detonating a bomb 
across the street or down the block will still make headlines. 
The reduction in risk to Western nations 
from war and violent crime has left 
terrorism as the high ground of threat.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
51
Observations and Conclusions
The burden of security against terrorist attack is determined more by the magnitude or 
number of potential targets to be protected than by the actual magnitude of the terrorist 
threat. A single terrorist incident involving aviation, for example, requires countermeasures 
at hundreds of commercial airports. Terrorists know and exploit this fact, boasting that their 
bombs cost only a few thousand dollars, while hundreds of millions must be spent on security.
Security is often and necessarily reactive. It is not difficult for terrorists and “red teams” 
thinking as terrorists to conjure up more scenarios than those charged with security can 
possibly protect against. Generally, the threat posed by more-frequently-occurring (and 
therefore demonstrable) nonpolitical crime drives security more than terrorism does.
Security is not an engineering problem that can 
be solved once and for all; rather, it is an ongoing 
contest between security planners and their 
terrorist adversaries. It must be dynamic. As new 
security measures are put into place, terrorists will 
seek ways to evade or obviate them. When the 
terrorists succeed, further new security measures 
will be required.
Illusion is an important component of security. What critics dismiss as charade, terrorists 
take more seriously. Their perceptions of consequences differ.
Despite the fact that terrorism is essentially psychological warfare aimed at the people 
watching, security strategies rarely include efforts to reduce fear. The current emphasis on 
resilience refers almost entirely to the physical recovery of vital systems after an attack, 
not the recovery of society’s psychological resistance. As a result, discussions of the threat 
and consequences of attack contribute to a continuing state of anxiety. Increasing security 
may not always reduce fear, it may only underscore perceptions of danger. We will return 
to this critical point.
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF SECURITY MEASURES
It is difficult to demonstrate empirically that security measures work. This difficulty results 
from the unique aspects of terrorism, as opposed to some other forms of economically 
motivated crime or more-conventional modes of warfare. And it is nearly impossible to 
measure the effects of individual security measures. Security must be seen as a holistic 
effort in which the measures facilitate and reinforce each other.
Terrorist successes are not necessarily security failures. And a security success is not 
always a terrorist failure, as a failed attack may still create 
alarm and oblige additional security measures to be taken. 
Nonetheless, further study of actual security failures, not 
efforts to assign blame, could provide useful insights. 
Failure to anticipate and thwart a terrorist attack is considered unacceptable because 
people believe that those charged with security could (and should) have envisioned such 
Security is not an engineering 
problem that can be solved once 
and for all; rather, it is an ongoing 
contest between security planners 
and their terrorist adversaries.
Terrorist successes are not 
necessarily security failures.
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an attack. While security planners often can and do envision attacks, this expectation puts 
them in a bind. They cannot get support for security measures against attacks they know 
might occur, but they are held liable for not implementing such measures if one does occur.
The “rare” quality of terrorist attacks makes it difficult to discern trends except over the 
very long run. Reductions may occur over decades, but many things are going on at the 
same time that also may account for them. The resolution of conflicts, the suppression or 
disappearance of specific terrorist groups, and gradual increases and improvements in 
security measures make it difficult to quantify the contribution of security measures to a 
reduction, in the narrower sense.
Physical security measures, by themselves, will not end or reduce terrorism. Ending or 
even reducing terrorism will require resolving the underlying conflict or suppressing the 
terrorist groups.
Moreover, although physical security measures rarely catch terrorists, catching them is the 
wrong criterion of effectiveness.
Security generally works as a deterrent. Terrorists want their operations to succeed, and 
changing patterns of terrorist attacks over long periods of time, along with anecdotal 
evidence, suggest that security can deter attacks on certain targets. 
Deterrence does not mean that no attack will occur; it means that security measures will 
displace risk to other, less-protected targets. Avoidance behavior is the most common 
way terrorists overcome security challenges. This indicates that they are aware of security 
measures and take them seriously enough to avoid or obviate them, for example, by 
shifting to other targets. Terrorists have an inherent advantage here. We can observe this 
effect, but we cannot easily quantify it.
Security measures should aim for a net security benefit. Increasing security in order to merely 
displace the risk from one target to another, while necessary in special circumstances, 
offers little net security benefit. This argues against disruptive and costly security efforts to 
protect public places.
Nevertheless, security measures have demonstrable utility. They can create operational 
problems for would-be attackers; affect terrorist target selection; reduce terrorist 
effectiveness; uncover explosive devices; detect weapons; assist authorities in quickly 
diagnosing and responding to attacks; help to quickly identify and apprehend perpetrators, 
thereby preventing further planned attacks; and facilitate rapid removal of innocent 
individuals from harm’s way.
Forcing terrorists to be suicidal reduces their recruiting pool. Some terrorists are suicidal—
unfazed by the prospect of death—-and this is sometimes offered as evidence of the 
futility of security as a deterrent. But raising the bar of required commitment is a security 
achievement, because few people possess that degree of dedication.
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Observations and Conclusions
Enlisting the public in security demonstrably works. One security measure that can be 
quantified and that appears to work in the area of surface-transportation security is enlisting 
staff and the public to call attention to suspicious behavior and objects. Public awareness 
in the United Kingdom seems to have helped in identifying explosive devices placed by 
the IRA. According to the MTI database, warnings by 
staff, on-scene security personnel, and passengers 
prevented 11 percent of terrorist bombings in Europe. 
This area merits further research.
Cost-benefit analysis is useful in articulating assumptions about the terrorist threat and 
evaluating security responses, but it cannot be the sole basis for assessing security 
measures. The readily quantifiable risks of terrorist attacks are too low to justify almost 
any security measure, while the psychological effects of terrorism are much more difficult 
to pin down or quantify. Yet it is the reaction to terrorism that poses the greatest threat to 
a country’s political system, economy, and social well-being.
A FINAL COMMENT
To return to an earlier observation, security strategy understandably has focused on 
risk reduction through prevention, physical protection, rapid response, and mitigation of 
casualties. These address the terrorism component of the threat but ignore the terror 
component. Terrorism and terror are separate domains. We have repeatedly seen that 
with limited violence, terrorists can achieve disproportionate results in the realm of terror. 
Indeed, the necessity of arguing for security resources, the responsibility of alerting 
people to danger, the visible security measures themselves, and the phenomenon of 
contemporary news-media coverage of terrorist events become accessories in the creation 
of fear. Although it lies outside the realm of physical security, the possibility of creating a 
counterterror strategy that draws upon traditional 
and admired strengths in American society—
courage, true grit, coolness under fire, self-reliance, 
sticking together in the face of danger, helping each 
other in emergencies—has hardly been explored. 
Such a strategy does not mean belittling individual 
fears, but rather building a less-vulnerable mindset.
Enlisting the public in security 
demonstrably works.
The possibility of creating a 
counterterror strategy that draws 
upon traditional and admired 
strengths in American society... 
has hardly been explored.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAPPS Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television
CPTED Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
GTD Global Terrorism Database
IRA Irish Republican Army
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MTI Mineta Transportation Institute
PNR Passenger Name Record
START Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
TSA Transportation Security Administration
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Department of Transportation’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R), University Transportation 
Centers Program, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. 
The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface 
transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community.
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas in-
clude: transportation security; planning and policy development; 
interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and profession-
al references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, 
the MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-lev-
el education to students seeking a career in the development 
and operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through 
San José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of 
Science in Transportation Management and a graduate Certifi-
cate in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the na-
tion’s transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s 
degree is the highest conferred by the California State Uni-
versity system. With the active assistance of the California 
Department of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over 
a state-of-the-art videoconference network throughout 
the state of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing 
working transportation professionals to pursue an advanced 
degree regardless of their location. To meet the needs of 
employers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education 
program promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results 
to transportation professionals and encourages Research 
Associates to present their findings at conferences. The 
World in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers 
innovation in the Institute’s research and education pro-
grams. MTI’s extensive collection of transportation-related 
publications is integrated into San José State University’s 
world-class Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented 
herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers 
Program and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily 
reflect the official views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability 
for the contents or use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation.
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